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Abstract
Presidential Epideictic Rhetoric During Times of Crisis: Barack Obama’s “9/11”
Moment
By
Michael Eisenstadt
Dr. Thomas R. Burkholder, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Communication Studies and Acting Chair
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Epideictic or ceremonial rhetoric, in its most basic and essential function, praises
or blames an object. Ceremonial speakers seek to articulate why those particular objects
are worthy of honor or the reverse. In the unfortunate event of a national tragedy, citizens
may be confused or troubled, presenting the need for clarification and reassurance. Often
times, concrete political solutions do not satisfy these needs because they do not explain
what has occurred in terms the public can understand and proceed from. Presidents often
inject memories of the past into public address to define these troubling situations in
ways that broad, national audiences can make sense of them. It is important to identify
the socio-political and cultural institutions that presidents rely on when they engage in
epideictic rhetoric so that critics can have a more articulate explanation of why society
defines itself the way it does and how future events are likely to be shaped. Close textual
analysis of Barack Obama’s September 12, 2012 Rose Garden Address and the second
presidential debate with Republican Presidential Nominee Mitt Romney revealed that the
public memory of September 11 has become commonplace in ceremonial discourse as a
way to explain to citizens the magnitude of contemporary troubling events. September
11, 2001 has become ingrained in the collective memory of U.S. citizens to such a degree
that it inescapably serves as the backdrop before which we tend to view all events even
iii

remotely related to terrorism. Each of the texts analyzed in this thesis provide ample
opportunity to draw new conclusions about this phenomenon. The Rose Garden Address
illustrates how crisis rhetoric and eulogies are strategically utilized by presidents to
refine our sense of community and urge perseverance in the face of threats to its stability.
Analyzing the town hall debate provides insight on the rhetorical strategies of campaign
orations and how they influence the degree to which the public becomes ingratiated by
presidential candidates. Given those analytical devices, this thesis proposes to refine the
functions of presidential epideictic rhetoric by updating them to reflect how presidents
enhance their ethos in contemporary rhetorical situations.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCING PRESIDENTIAL EPIDEICTIC RHETORIC
DURING TIMES OF CRISIS
The Rhetorical Artifacts
September 11, 2001 is a day which annually reminds Americans that the United
States is not invulnerable to tragedy. On the 11th anniversary of the attacks on the World
Trade Center and the pentagon, the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya was assaulted
resulting in the death of four American diplomats. Chris Stevens, America’s ambassador
to Libya, was one of the fallen envoys. This spectacle created a situation requiring a
special type of response that needed to quell the fears of citizens while affirming and
honoring the lives lost in the battering. A day after the incident, President Barack Obama
delivered a speech at the Rose Garden to achieve these ends.
Relative to other speeches delivered by Obama, this address has received little
attention. The pointed reaction to the attacks in Benghazi has focused on whether
sufficient intelligence existed to prevent the deaths of American diplomats. This task has
mostly been at the hands of politicians and their media outlets for disseminating soundbite information. Such a focus distracts from an important investigation of the intricacies
of Obama’s speech and the implications for both the immediate situation and its
development.
Because 2012 was a presidential election year, Stevens’ death prompted public
comment not only by President Obama but also by former Massachusetts governor Mitt
Romney, the Republican presidential nominee. Obama’s address at the Rose Garden was
the first official statement by the government following the events in Libya. The public

1

was aware of the attack already; a leadership figure of appropriate stature had yet to
speak on the event. Preliminary analysis suggested two primary purposes of the Rose
Garden speech.
President Obama was motivated by two interrelated rhetorical situations. The first
was the Benghazi attack itself. As the country’s top leader, the President’s address
needed to define and explain the event so that U.S. citizens could digest and understand
the spectacle and its consequences. Obama’s task was significant because the attack
occurred on the same date that the people of the United States of America will forever
remember as the anniversary of burning towers collapsing to the ground in New York.
This attribute of the event alone created complications for fostering a public
understanding of the incident. Discourse related to 9/11 has seeped into American society
in a variety of ways, ranging from a new-found era of patriotism to the constant paranoia
of imminent terrorism. Before Obama had the chance to address the nation, media outlets
had already proliferated rumors of the Benghazi attacks having direct relation to AlQaeda, the group claiming responsibility for 9/11. Political scientists have characterized
the situation as part of a game of cat and mouse in an election year, but this moment may
signify something more important about terror-related crisis discourse in American
Presidential Rhetoric.1
The second, but related, situation motivating Obama’s address was the death of
four U.S. diplomats, including the American Ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens. In
defining the Benghazi attack and assigning meaning to its aftermath, Obama needed to
recognize those lives which were lost and affirm their existence as disciples of U.S.
values and beliefs. Although friends or family members likely experienced a more
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intimate relationship with the fallen diplomats, they were not positioned to eulogize their
loved ones for an audience as large as the entire United States population.
Obama was the only suitable aspirant for delivering the eulogy. Although the
immediate family and close friends of the diplomats may have more to say about the
envoys as individuals, only the President possesses the capacity to speak to the
“community” composed of a large swath of the people of the United States. Particularly
in troubling times, a strong leader is needed to affirm the fundamental values and beliefs
of the country to reduce audience anxiety and provide an optimistic vision of the future.
This is also the case because only the President has the political and moral authority to
link the diplomats, the countries values, and its citizens to the event creating widespread
confusion.
Each of the two purposes for Obama’s Rose Garden address tested the President’s
leadership skills. Fostering a public understanding of the phenomenon required Obama to
achieve identification with listeners and viewers by using terminology which connects
the people of the United States directly to the event. If the general populace lacked an
understanding of the attack, shrouds of mystery would be left looming above. There is no
guarantee that the people of the United States would agree with the President’s stance on
the issue, but accessing the audience based on shared communal experiences and values
at least creates the potential for pervasive adherence. Eulogizing murdered diplomats also
tests Obama’s leadership expertise because it must unequivocally mourn human losses
and encourage the country that its resolve is not on the verge of collapse.
Given these two goals, this thesis interprets Obama’s Rose Garden address as an
epideictic event. At no point in the text does the President make explicit his
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Administration’s deliberative policies that ought to follow the attack. Although policies
regarding embassy and consulate security were later discussed, they were not a part of the
conversation in the immediate aftermath. Instead, the country’s leadership was primarily
concerned with nurturing a public definition and thus understanding of a spectacular
event that were not immediately clear because of its geographical and geopolitical
distance from U.S. soil. Nevertheless, epideictic speech need not serve an exclusively
ceremonial function. In fact, ceremonial rhetoric can function to prepare an audience for
making a deliberative decision. The values and beliefs a speaker chooses to attach to the
meaning of a text influence the type of community it will create and motivate.
In the wake of Obama’s Rose Garden address, a controversy arose over the way
the President chose to characterize the attacks in Benghazi. Criticism from political
opponents targeted the Obama Administration’s inability to secure the embassy and
diplomats in advance. The Executive branch of government, including the President,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and other members of the administration initially
claimed that the attack had been spontaneous, but a controversy arose when Clinton and
others shifted away from the explanation that Obama offered. Initially, the President
articulated the attack as one of the “acts of terror” which pose a threat to the values and
national security of the United States.2 This phrase sparked disagreement about whether
the attack was spontaneous or planned, since if it turned out to be politically-motivated,
the Obama Administration’s claim about being unaware of the attack would instead paint
the picture of a lapse in intelligence.
Just over a month after Obama’s Rose Garden address, the second presidential
debate between Obama and Romney was held in a “town hall” format where audience
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members asked each candidate questions about their policies on a variety of issues.
Despite the wide variety of topics addressed, Benghazi warrants particular highlighting.
The debate was intended to be exclusively about domestic topics, but when Kerry Ladka
asked Obama whether “the State Department refused extra security for our embassy in
Benghazi, Libya, prior to the attacks that killed four Americans,” a question of
responsibility emerged demanding to know “Who was it that denied enhanced security
and why?”3
Televised presidential debates provide citizens a sort of illusion that policy issues
are actually being argued and contested. None of the questions asked, including the one
on Benghazi, produced a literal policy from either Obama or Romney although policy
details were hashed out. Instead, each candidate used political issue talking points as a
means of building the type of ethos or personal credibility that would win over the votes
of undecided citizens. In other words, both the Democrat and Republican nominees used
their comments on the Benghazi attacks to burnish their own images as strong, forceful
leaders. The intense focus of the Benghazi “debate” was over the use of the word “terror”
to describe the attack. For Obama, the primary goal was to maximize his credibility by
delivering an answer that conveyed a sense of dedication to national security and
confidence in the ability of the United States to combat terrorism.
All three debates between Obama and Romney were geared towards building
support for the candidates and not their policies. Although the town hall meeting is
formally characterized as a debate, the Benghazi question and the responses following it
exemplify a spectacle intended to illustrate the leadership character of the presidential
contenders. For this question in particular, the candidates’ statements served more of a
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ceremonial than a genuine deliberative purpose. As such, this thesis examines the text of
the debate as epideictic speech because its purpose is more about establishing the
desirability for either Obama or Romney to become the president instead of one for
creating and enforcing particular policies. Both Oval Office aspirants are enacting a
persona of leadership to form a community, campaigning to show their value and worth
as a president, and using debate over the Benghazi crisis as a pivot to demonstrate they
already possess the necessary leadership skills.
Obama’s Rose Garden Address and the town hall debate are distinct because they
are motivated by different rhetorical circumstances. However, these situations are
connected to one another in two important ways. First, they are directly related by topic.
The chronological and topical developments of the Benghazi issue are made transparent
and visible by investigating these two texts. Second, analyzing the two speeches holds the
potential for providing new insight into the epideictic genre of rhetoric. Neither of these
texts have been investigated thoroughly for their epideictic (or even rhetorical) functions,
but instead for their political values in an election cycle. There are valuable discoveries to
be unearthed about presidential strategies for epideictic occasions and how they differ
from one environment to another.
Analytical Framework
As mentioned previously, this thesis views both Obama’s Rose Garden speech
and the presidential debate as examples of epideictic rhetoric. Prior to constructing and
deploying this analytical scheme for the thesis, this analysis first thoroughly investigates
each text to discover its unique attributes and messages. Therefore, the first step in in the
critical process is performing a close textual analysis of the pieces. A deep textual study
6

satisfies two necessary components of rhetorical criticism. First, the texts are closely
examined for their intrinsic properties, highlighting the unique characteristics that inform
their purposes through supporting materials, overall tone, and structure. Second, such
investigation locates the texts in relation to their historical settings.4 This process
considers equally the language properties of the document with the audience and situation
which brings a rhetor forward. Engaging in this sort of analysis demonstrates that speech
acts are not simply responses to a situation, but instead delicately crafted strategies to
confront and resolve them. Second, these strategies are treated thoroughly, ranging from
the purposeful use of emotional appeals, artistic use of language, and attempts to
strengthen the institutions the rhetor seeks to use in resolving a public issue.5
After the completion of a close textual analysis and after placing the two texts
within their historical and cultural contexts, an analytical framework is necessary for
testing and theorizing the initial findings. To argue simply that this project uses
“epideictic” as a lens for illustrating the text’s properties is far too broad an interpretation
of the genre. Instead, a working definition of “epideictic” must be formulated. A proper
understanding of epideictic rhetoric must trace back to Aristotle, who named the initial
three divisions of oratory.
For the ancients, rhetoric was confined almost exclusively to oral pleading which
Aristotle divided into three categories: deliberative or political, forensic or judicial, and
epideictic or ceremonial.6 In that taxonomy, deliberative speech seeks to establish either
the expediency or inexpediency of some future course of action. In a contemporary sense,
deliberative speeches may occur when a president argues that the country ought to go to
war or when a member of Congress believes that the Affordable Care Act ought to be
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repealed because of its financial burdens. Any time a policy objective is being debated, a
deliberative element is at least present if not predominant in the way arguments are
delivered.
Forensic speeches are those which seek to establish either the justice or injustice
of some past action, as in the courts.7 In forensic speeches, legal advocates seek either to
convict or acquit individuals who are charged with some crime. Again in a contemporary
sense, defense attorneys and prosecutors perform forensic speech acts in a courtroom
every day.
Aristotle’s third category of oratory, epideictic rhetoric seeks either to honor or
dishonor someone or something. To do so, it “either praises or censures somebody” in
what he calls a “ceremonial oratory of display.”8 A ceremonial speaker must craft a
definition of what qualifies as worthy of praise or censorship. One cannot simply ask an
audience to celebrate or disregard an object without some rationale. This rationalization
of praise or blame need not emerge from scientific data, but it must succeed in
compelling an audience that participating in the acceptance or rejection of an object is
beneficial and necessary. Therefore, an epideictic speaker is not necessarily aiming to
“prove” a point, but instead to demonstrate “that the good or the harm, the honour [sic] or
disgrace” of the object under scrutiny.9 The speaker is tasked with convincing an
audience that the object of their focus is worthy of honor or shame.
While Aristotle’s ceremonial oratory is foundational to understanding the
epideictic genre, it is incomplete. This is not because Aristotle lacked precision or
breadth; it is simply an outdated perspective. What once satisfied the eulogies and
celebrations of ancient Greece cannot account for the sheer number of objects and events
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receiving commemoration and honor in the 21st century. Contemporary epideictic studies
are guided but not completed by the assumption that all ceremonial speeches contain
some degree of praise and/or blame, but these two terms cannot alone explain all of the
possible perspectives and functions of epideictic rhetoric.10
Celeste M. Condit provides an update to Aristotle on studies of epideictic rhetoric.
Condit identifies three possible perspectives from which a ceremonial speaker may
approach a situation. First, a message-centered perspective is most similar to a classical
interpretation, where the primary goal of the speaker is to praise or blame an object.11 A
speaker-centered orientation occurs when a rhetor develops an argument or performance
to satisfy ceremonial functions. Orators adopting a speaker-centered perspective “forms a
central part of the art of persuasion” since it builds the “intensity of adherence” an
audience has to a series of arguments or purposes.12 Finally, an audience-centered focus
on epideictic examines instances where spectators make a judgment of a speaker’s
presence and ability or the types of experience viewers have as a result of some
ceremonial discourse.13 Together, these three perspectives offer a range of functions that
a wide spectrum of various epideictic speeches execute to achieve a purpose. At least one
of the three perspectives can be located in an epideictic text; often more than one is
present.14
Epideictic situations, Condit argues, emerge when some distressing event creates
a need for both a community and its leadership. The community needs to know what the
event is, what it means, and how to proceed. A leader needs to calm any hysteria, bring
the community affected together, and convince them that they will endure the situation.
To account for the ways leaders satisfy these needs, Condit identified a “‘family’ of
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characteristics shared by epideictic speeches” that locates ceremonial discourse through
“three functional pairs.”15 These pairs of functions demonstrate that epideictic speech is
the means leaders use to bring a community up to speed with the situation they are wary
of. In each pair, the first term is a function that the text serves the speaker, while the
second is a corresponding function for the audience.
The first functional grouping of epideictic rhetoric is creating
“definition/understanding” of a “confusing or troubling” “event, person group, or
object.”16 An orator explains that a troubling issue exists, often directly connecting the
event to spectators. A troubling event need not be some gargantuan catastrophe, it may be
as large as September 11 or as beneath the radar as the Benghazi attack or even a funeral
or commencement. To help clarify and resolve the confusion of the audience, the rhetor
creates an understanding through values and beliefs that connect the audience to the
problem when a speaker inculcates “a common vocabulary of excellence among its
witnesses.”17 By using these belief systems to explain the troubling phenomenon, the
speaker eases the audience’s anxiety and clarifies the state of the event. If successful, the
capacity to make an audience understand situations also gives a rhetor definitional
authority. This phenomenon is seen in Obama’s Rose Garden address; there is an explicit
allusion to September 11 immediately before the President deems the attack on the U.S.
consulate an act of terror.
Given that most audiences of important nation-wide addresses are politically,
culturally, and spatially separated, in order to shape a sense of community which
members of that diverse audience can share, an orator must look for a collective identity
rooted in “a conjoint remembrance of a certain event, no matter where those who
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remember are located or how otherwise unrelated they are to each other.”18 Thus, a rhetor
shapes a community by targeting objects or values to which the aggregate audience has a
relationship to, and shares with that community a vision of what it will come to be in the
future. Generally, this strategy invokes a community with a renewed “conception of itself
and of what is good by explaining what it has previously held to be good” and establishes
this relationship to the audience “through the relationships of those past values and
beliefs” which influence the new situation.19
Condit’s third functional pair of epideictic features is “display/entertainment.” An
orator must display eloquence, the combination of truth, beauty and power in speech,
while also entertaining an audience by expanding the meaning of some important value
or belief system they hold.20 Entertainment is perhaps a misleading term in this instance,
because the aim is that the audience recognizes, acknowledges, and accepts the leadership
of a speaker. If speakers demonstrate that they are knowledgeable, influential, and artistic
in their judgments, then their audience may esteem them as leaders. An eloquent orator
“stands a good chance of being a desirable leader for the community,” and presidential
debates in particular are “one of our best chances to judge the eloquence . . . of a wouldbe leader.”21 This is because the policy arguments and special interest appeals are
present, but they are springboards for a demonstration that the nominee has leadership
capacity and a strong vision of where the country ought to be headed.
The Benghazi attack was a “troubling event” because information surrounding the
event was made public before any official government response had occurred. Rumors
whirled around the internet about who was responsible for the attack, the possibility of
additional assaults, and the inability of the country’s leadership to respond to these issues.
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Presidents respond to these types of situations by using their ethos “to create ‘crisis’
situations” that attempt to exonerate the nation from guilt while strategically framing the
issue to garner support from the audience.22
Bonnie J. Dow extended Condit’s theory of contemporary ceremonial rhetoric,
arguing that some forms of presidential “crisis” rhetoric are most appropriately viewed as
epideictic. Dow argues that when a president “responds to events already seen as serious,
even critical,” they are engaging in “crisis rhetoric.”23 When a speech responds to a crisis,
it is an epideictic strategy presidents use to create a communal understanding of a
troubling problem where “the primary audience” is the American public.24 Such crisis
speeches have three characteristics; they must present evidence that defines a situation as
a crisis; they must compare and contrast the “pure motives of the United States and the
evil motives of the enemy;” and finally must attempt to promote “a practical, political
context” by using a “moral, ethical” one.25
A “crisis” may include a wide range of rhetorical situations, but with the
assumption that the American people are the primary audience, there are few crises more
troubling or confusing than the sudden death of United States citizens. This is because
although “the audience is not personally involved,” they need a meaning of the event “for
the nation as a whole” in order to “know how the nation will proceed.”26 Mixed emotions
of paranoia, anger, and anxiety may stir up in the event that sound-bites of American
deaths sweep the nation without a response from the government. When a crisis situation
emerges in which the audience is aware of the troubling events before the President
speaks, the discourse resembles the epideictic rhetoric described by Condit in that it seeks
to promote understanding of the event and thus calm the public. Summarily, the President
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employs crisis discourse in an epideictic situation to amalgamate a large audience using
communal values, fostering an understanding of an event in relation to those principles,
and urges public determination through a troubled time.
Although the Rose Garden address seems even at first glance to fit within the
epideictic genre, this is not as clear for the presidential debate. Nevertheless, a close
examination of campaign rhetoric—which the debate surely was—reveals that it, too,
attempts to achieve epideictic aims. Michael Leff and Gerald P. Mohrmann provide the
final element necessary for understanding how a contemporary theory of epideictic
discourse can help illuminate the presidential debate between Obama and Romney. Leff
and Mohrmann argue that campaign discourse is essentially a rhetorical hybrid,
employing deliberative means to achieve epideictic ends. This analysis concerns itself
with the ways that audience members judge the leadership skills and eloquence of the
candidates. Therefore, to investigate how Obama and Romney displayed their leadership,
this thesis proceeds from Robert Rowland’s characterization of American voters and how
they “now have little tolerance for detailed and/or complex arguments” and thus “judge
such debates toward a more theatrical standard.”27
In the town hall debate, the epideictic goal changes; instead of seeking to move
the nation beyond some trouble or confusion, presidential nominees are flexing their
eloquence to promote themselves as worthy of the presidency. A debate is not the same
type of “praise or blame” as eulogies, commemorations, addresses, and so forth.
Argument contests in presidential campaigns have “the actual purpose . . . to gain votes”
and “the ostensible purpose . . . to gain acceptance” of the particular policies discussed.28
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In other words, campaign debates mirror the functions of commemoration or address for
the audience but serve a different purpose for the speaker instead.
To this extent, campaign rhetoric is something of a rhetorical hybrid; the debate
uses seemingly deliberative means via the discussion of policies to achieve epideictic
ends, enhancing the ethos of the candidates through strong presentation and defense of
their principles. Presenting their policy platforms is simply a way for candidates to seem
better suited for the position of President of the United States. For this to succeed,
candidates must generate an image of themselves as an acceptable and attractive
alternative to their opponents. The argumentative contest between Obama and Romney,
then, “is best characterized as a campaign oration, a speech designed to win” enough
votes to secure the election.29 Although both candidates put forth passion into their policy
arguments, “the treatment of issues is subsidiary to the purpose of creating a general
identification between the speaker and the audience,” making the ultimate objective of a
campaign oratory “ingratiation.”30
Much like crisis rhetoric, campaign oratory too may serve both deliberative and
epideictic ends. Paul Rosenthal calls this the distinction between “non-personal and
personal persuasion.”31 Non-personal persuasion seeks to alter spectator’s attitudes about
a situation using substantive arguments which are enhanced by ethos. When a president
wishes to declare war on another nation, the data to support the Executive’s arguments
and the ethos of the speaker becomes secondary to the outcome. Personal persuasion
inverts this prioritization; the speaker becomes the object and uses the message as a
catalyst for augmenting their ethos. The presidential nominees may in fact still be seeking
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acceptance or approval of an object through belief, but their immediate rhetorical motive
is to ascertain enough votes to ascend to or retain their position in the Oval Office.
Framing the town hall debate as a back-and-forth of “personal persuasion”
enables the project to narrow the text to study an important segment while preserving its
purpose, functions, and style. The working definition of epideictic presented fits both
texts suggested in this proposal for deep analyses with the screens of “crisis rhetoric” and
“personal persuasion” to guide them. These screens will illuminate the Rose Garden
address and second presidential debate in ways that have yet to be explored by scholars.
In doing so, there are a wide variety of possible outcomes, each with their own
implications for the field of rhetoric, and more precisely, presidential epideictic speech.
Benefits of the Study
There are two objectives this thesis project seeks to complete. First, in a narrow
sense, this thesis will increase our understanding of two rhetorical events that were
important for the 2012 U.S. presidential election. Currently, both of these texts are treated
pre-dominantly by political scientists, understood and criticized as deliberative speech
acts. This project points out not only that these are epideictic events, but also that there is
more going on here than historians or political scientists may give credit for.
More broadly, this scholarship enhances our understanding of the epideictic
genre. The project examines and compares a speech that contains both crisis discourse
and delivers a eulogy to explain a troubling object with a town hall debate where the
speaker is the object. Obama’s Rose Garden Address sheds light on how epideictic texts
are constantly engaged in praise and blame for an overarching purpose, while the debate
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confirms that Aristotle’s conception of the three divisions of oratory are more fluid than
they appear.
Order of Chapters
This thesis is broken into five chapters. Chapter two consists of a socio-cultural
and political introduction to the aftermath of the attacks in Benghazi. The contextual
events surrounding the texts, before and afterward, are important for framing the
arguments of the thesis. It is also important to understand the positions of relevant
political figures and media outlets since they are crucial to the concatenation of screens
between speaker and audience in both occasions.
Chapter three develops the analytical framework that will guide analysis of the
texts in much more depth, fully exploring the uses and functions of epideictic, crisis
rhetoric, and campaign orations. This section addresses the needed updates from previous
works for moving forward with new case studies of epideictic events. Chapter four
applies the theoretical framework developed in the prior chapter, performing an in depth
analysis that digs deep into the crevices of Obama’s Rose Garden Address and the town
hall debate between President Obama and Republican nominee Mitt Romney. Finally,
Chapter five contains concluding remarks and outcomes of the project, offering advice
for future research as well as identifying the strengths and limitations discovered
throughout the project.
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CHAPTER 2: FROM ONE 9/11 TO ANOTHER, CONTEXTUALIZING THE
RHETORICAL SITUATION
The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. These are the words of Aristotle,
and the key to digging deep into textual artifacts. Much can be said about President
Barack Obama’s Rose Garden address and the town hall debate between Obama and
Republican Presidential Nominee Mitt Romney on their own. However, these artifacts
cannot be investigated in great detail without understanding the contextual elements
which shape their rhetorical situations. Each artifact examined in this thesis must be
framed by the social, cultural, and historical issues from which they emerged. A historian
might examine the speech and debate as simply two points on a constellation of occasions
which map out a broader story. Rhetoricians perform the study inversely; the wider
background illuminates the properties of texts to better inform readers on the goals and
strategies rhetors employ. Therefore, this chapter examines how the Rose Garden
Address and presidential debate are situated within a larger, ongoing, historical context,
complete with obstacles that must be overcome if Obama is to achieve his rhetorical
purpose.
The Origins of “9/11” Discourse
On the morning of September 11, 2001, the United States experienced the most
traumatic attack since the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The World Trade Center in New
York City and the Pentagon, just outside Washington, D.C., were struck by commercial
airliners full of passengers whose lives were taken. Another plane, possibly targeting the
White House or the U.S. Capitol, crashed into a field near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, after

19

passengers tried to overcome the hijackers, killing all onboard. Thousands more died in
New York and Washington. Emergency responders and rescuers also risked and
sacrificed their lives in the process of dousing flames and carrying scorched bodies.
Institutions were shut down, classes canceled, and flights grounded. The nation was
stunned. Our innocence and our sense of invulnerability were shattered.
Memory scholar Barbie Zelizer makes the general comment that complex
historical events “become used up as resources for the establishment and continued
maintenance of memory in its social, collective form.”1 The lives lost, the economic
damage, and emotional carnage endured by the people of the United States on that day
has not been forgotten. Functioning as a referent, the attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon have continuously framed social, cultural, and political American
issues. Events that ring of terrorism, Al-Qaeda, Afghanistan, or even the World Trade
Center all trace back to that fateful day in recent United States history. In this case,
September 11, 2001 has become ingrained in the collective memory of U.S. citizens to
such a degree that it inescapably serves as the backdrop before which we tend to view all
events even remotely related to “terrorism.” Kendall Phillips, another memory scholar,
explains that this emerges from “the instantaneous framing” of the attacks on the World
Trade Center “by the media in relation to other national tragedies” to create “the
overwhelming feeling that no one would ever forget,” September 11, 2001.2
In a wide variety of ways, the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon continue to influence the way we think about, and talk about events that we see
as somehow related. Of particular significance, as public memory academic Edward S.
Casey argues, is the way September 11 “linked everyone present in a common concern

20

and that the imagistic, gesticulatory, and linguistic practices in which we engaged all
addressed this concern in one way or another.”3 Further, Casey articulates that September
11 is a flashbulb memory. This term has two implications. First, the event links U.S.
citizens together because they “remember exactly where they were on hearing of” the
attacks.4 Second, and more importantly, the destruction of the World Trade Center has
become a screen or filter through which later events are interpreted by the public at large.
Acts of politically-motivated violence on the United States, either by citizens or unknown
individuals, are branded as subjects of the broader War on Terror.
Both the Shoe Bomber and Christmas Bomber attacks demonstrate the media’s
urge to create linkages with September 11. On September 22, 2001, just 11 days after the
attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Richard Reid attempted to ignite a
bomb on a packed flight from Paris to Miami. News reports had mixed reactions to the
motive behind Reid’s attempt to attack the United States. The BBC reported that although
links had not “yet been established between Mr. Reid and Osama Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda
network,” there was a distinct possibility that he “may have been recruited for terrorist
acts” which gave “this whole campaign an additional dimension.”5 Another BBC article
further reports that “at some point Reid began to get involved with extremist elements”
including Zacarias Moussaoui, an individual “charged in the US with conspiracy over the
11 September attacks.”6 Matthew Miller, the Director of Public Affairs for the Justice
Department, explicitly labeled Reid an al-Qaeda terrorist, although such evidence at the
time did not exist.7
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, better known by U.S. citizens as the Christmas
Bomber, attempted to detonate plastic explosives in his underwear on a flight from
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Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day, 2009. In response to the attack, 9/11
Commissioner Tom Kean expressed “an ugly, but familiar, ring.”8 Kean expressed that
“it feels like after 9/11,” “no one is connecting the dots” because it was immediately
apparent that the incident was “the same thing all over again.”9 The symbolic weight of
the airplane as a weapon is directly situated by September 11, 2001. However,
commercial airliners are not the only type of attacks which are framed by September 11.
The Eleventh Anniversary of the 11th
Exactly eleven years after the attacks on New York and Washington, the United
States was attacked again, this time at its consulate in Benghazi, Libya. Media coverage
in the immediate aftermath was scarce since word of the attack did not reach the United
States until late evening on September 11, 2012. CNN correspondents received
information at 10:00 PM, EST, confirming that “someone at the American Consulate in
Benghazi is dead,” but it was “unclear if that person” was “an American citizen.”10
Although there was speculation about who may have been killed, there were “conflicting
reports” and the State Department said “it doesn’t have independent confirmation of that
death.”11 What was clear was that the attack was a “huge event” because a “breach of an
embassy or consulate’s walls or security on any given day would be tremendous” and the
date of the attack, September 11, instantly sparked “increasing concerns about al Qaeda
presence.”12
CNN also reported that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton confirmed “that a State
Department officer was killed in an attack on the American consulate in Benghazi” based
on “word from the Libyans” but that there were no “details as of yet as to how this
gentleman met his death.”13 Speculation suggested that the attack was likely inspired by
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“an armed mob protesting a film deemed offensive to Islam” that began in Cairo and
continued in Benghazi.14 Despite this initial conclusion, “it was not immediately clear”
whether this was the cause of the attack or if the event reflected more generally “how
much the ground in the Middle East has shifted” away from U.S. influence due to the
instability of the Arab Spring.15 Wanis Sharef from Libya’s Interior Ministry informed
U.S. intelligence that “hundreds of protestors . . . broke into the consulate building” but
could not clearly articulate who had been killed or who led the attack.16 In the wee hours
of September 12, the public learned that American ambassador J. Christopher Stevens
had been killed and there were likely other American diplomats slain as well.
Despite the paucity of information about the Benghazi attack at this point, the
people of the United States began immediately to interpret it against the backdrop of the
2001 attack. Without the initial attack, Benghazi might have drawn less public attention
for a shorter period of time. However, the framing of September 11 ensured that the
assault on the consulate in Benghazi would sustain and re-constitute the ongoing
uncertainty and paranoia that was felt a decade prior. After all, as John W. Jordan notes,
“each conversation about 9/11 brings about interpretations designed to reframe its
meaning in line with a specific purpose.”17 Similar to the attack in 2001, the looming fear
presented important questions to U.S. citizens that needed an answer. Who was
responsible for the Benghazi attack? Was it al-Qaeda? Why did they do it? Why were we
unable to prevent it? Will they strike us again? These questions demanded an answer.
Less than twenty-four hours after the attack, the first official and extended answer
came from President Obama in a speech in the White House the Rose Garden. Hillary
Clinton had made comments to the press prior to Obama’s speech, but they were not
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addressed to the nation, nor were they delivered as a speech. Greg Miller and Michael
Birnbaum characterized Obama’s address as “unusually emotional” for both its
commemoration of Chris Stevens and the promise to avenge their deaths and bring to
justice all parties participating in the attack.18 Close administration aides recalled the
speech as a signal of “heartfelt prayers” to the loved ones of the fallen envoys and not the
type of typical polarized “contrasting speech” America had been bombarded with
because of campaign advertising for the upcoming presidential election.19 However, the
speech did contrast two important matters. Obama began the speech by eulogizing
Stevens and making it clear that other diplomats had also been slain; but he continued by
linking the Benghazi attack to the September 11, 2001, attacks, making an explicit
allusion to that earlier, tragic time in connection with bringing justice to the perpetrators.
It is this portion of Obama’s address that became the intense loci of political talking
points for the weeks following it.
In the wake of Obama’s address, the media provided more detailed coverage of
the attack. Government officials quoted in newspapers, on television, and online offered
tentative explanations but remained anonymous due to the “sensitivity of the situation.”20
The Washington Post collected a large sample of this commentary on the same day as the
speech. Officials’ remarks were puzzling and ambiguous, doubtless reflections of
uncertainty due to the immediacy of the situation:
A senior U.S. intelligence official said, "We haven't seen any significant
indication of al-Qaeda involvement in this attack," adding that there are
conflicting indications of the extent to which it was planned. "We've seen some
indications that point us in that direction and others that do not," said the official,
who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the
situation. He declined to elaborate, except to say that U.S. spy agencies had seen
no intelligence indicating such an attack was coming. U.S. officials said the CIA,
the FBI and other agencies were mobilizing to identify and pursue the attackers,
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an effort that could be aided by U.S. drones that have continued to conduct
surveillance flights over the country since Tripoli fell 13 months ago. Officials
said the assault may have been carried out by an affiliate of al-Qaeda, perhaps
seeking to avenge the death of a Libyan who had served as the terrorist group's
No. 2 operative until he was killed in Pakistan in June by a U.S. drone strike.21
These expert accounts became the source of intense debate about the true cause of the
attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi.
One “senior U.S. intelligence official” argued that although no significant
evidence of al-Qaeda’s participation is present, there were “some indications that point us
in that direction and others that do not.”22 When pressed about what those indications
might be, the “official” failed to elaborate except for one important detail, “that U.S. spy
agencies had seen no intelligence indicating such an attack was coming.”23 Other
officials, not necessarily of “senior” stature, held positions that “an affiliate of al-Qaeda”
seeking vengeance was involved.24 These “experts” had a number of warrants for their
claim, but one in particular stands out, that “the suspicion of al-Qaeda involvement was
supported by the Sept. 11 timing.”25 Succinctly, some expert testimony was purposefully
vague describing the suspected attacker(s), but did not resist making the claim that
“fingers pointed to possible al-Qaeda affiliates,” justified by the anniversary of the
“attack on Sept. 11.”26 Instead of a blunt statement that the details of the attack were still
unknown, a debate was initiated over who was responsible for the infiltration of the U.S.
Consulate in Benghazi.
Commentary clearly illustrates that people viewed the Benghazi attack through
the filter or screen of the 2001 attacks. The utility of flashbulb memory lies in connecting
as many people with the simplest understanding of a tragic event possible. Projecting the
image of the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon instantly framed
the issue in the angst, anxiety, and emotion that the U.S. felt that day. We may seriously
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underestimate the psychological power this image holds. People make snap decisions
based on their memory of past events without bothering to understand the facts of the
new situation.
Gary Ackerman and William Potter argue that these snap decisions have drastic
consequences. They suggest that the “scapegoating of population groups” with repeated
blame for terror attacks “might even lead to behaviors encouraging social reversion and
the general deterioration of civil society” should a major attack succeed.27 The paranoia
experienced across the nation in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, is only
a miniscule reaction compared to what would result from the use of weapons of mass
destruction by terrorist organizations. Although Benghazi is certainly not an example of
this, the attack still feeds into a well-sustained set of exigencies surrounding the War on
Terror. Despite the unlikely probability of a large-scale terrorist attack involving weapons
of mass destruction, Theodore Caplow notes that the nation must be prepared for the
social calamities that would ensue in its aftermath.28 Of importance here is the persuasive
and constitutive weight the September 11 frame carries. Whether or not proof is ever
obtained, this structure has been compelling across the board. Justifications for invading
Afghanistan and Iraq, the securitization of commercial airports, and intervening in
politically volatile states are all, at least in part, built on the narrative of the attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
With regard to September 11, 2012, the uncertain and anonymous testimony
about responsibility remained unsettling because of the failure of a significant,
identifiable orator to confirm or deny the unnamed “officials” allegations of terrorist
activity. Further complicating the matter, the leader of Al-Qaeda was reported to have
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“praised the assault on the American Consulate in Benghazi . . . but stopped short of
claiming responsibility.”29 Surely the praise of the attack supports claims that Al-Qaeda
may have been involved, but falls far short of direct proof.
In the days following the President’s address at the Rose Garden, a blame game
emerged with explicit and polarized explanations. More “officials” came forward after
Obama’s address with new allegations. David Ignatius reported in the Washington Post
that “what’s happening in . . . Benghazi appears to be a case of political opportunism . . .
by Salafist Islamic extremists” that were “linked to al-Qaeda.”30 As David D. Kirkpatrick
and Steven Lee Meyers of the New York Times wrote, other “officials” contested these
accounts, cautioning that “it was too soon to tell whether the attack was related to the
anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks.”31 Even testimony that disavowed al-Qaeda’s
involvement, however, did agree that the attackers “appeared to have at least some level
of advance planning.”32 Who then, carried out the attacks on the U.S. Consulate if
“reports from some terrorism experts that the attack may be linked to the recent death in
drone strikes of senior Qaeda leaders . . . were unsupported?”33
Competing testimonies began questioning the legitimacy of connections between
the Consulate in Benghazi and Islamic extremists affiliated with al-Qaeda. Interestingly
enough, the opposition to the “Sept. 11” argument relies on equally troubling evidence.
The “preliminary reports” which “speculated that the violence grew spontaneously” were
dismissed by “U.S. and Libyan officials” because of the finesse and nuance of the
attack.34 A mystery remained not only surrounding who attacked the consulate, but also
why they were motivated to do so.
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Witness reports from Morocco World News documented “an armed mob
protesting over a film” outside of the U.S. Consulate in the moments before the attack.35
This film was, as Africa News characterized it, a Youtube video that deemed Islam a
“cancer” and depicted the Prophet Mohammed as an adulterous figure.36 However,
members of the protest admitted that while they rejected the video “in the strongest
possible terms,” they “were not officially involved or were not ordered to be involved”
with the attack on the consulate.37 Given that intelligence officials across the board
agreed that the attackers had some type of expertise, their response to blaming the
protestors was that terrorists, as Greg Miller and Michael Birnbaum explain, “joined
protestors outside the consulate” but they “neither chanted slogans nor carried banners,”
instead opening and spraying gunfire.38 Although the film sparked a massive outrage,
officials perceived it as an underwhelming reason for a group to form and take down a
U.S. Consulate. If a terrorist group had “cannily taken advantage of the protest at the
consulate,” what was their motivation?39 What was the diversion for?
Acts of terrorism are intended to create fear, instability, and a looming paranoia.
Terrorists require a target that symbolizes their enemy’s greatest, strongest assets. In
other words, as David Ignatius of the Washington Post described it, factions were
“battling for power in a fluid political situation” that presents an ample opportunity for
inducing horror and anxiety by seizing a U.S. Consulate in a politically unstable
environment.40 The attack worried policy-makers so much that it was expected “any
minute” after reports came in, according to Mark McDonald of the New York Times, that
a demand for “more rigorous security at American embassies and consulates around the
world” would follow.41 Still, this did not provide a significant reason to target the
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consulate for a terrorist agenda because although it would trigger a reaction from policymakers, it might not reach U.S. citizens in the way desired.
The announcement that Chris Stevens was a victim of the traumatic experience
prompted Kirkpatrick and Meyers to point out that “it was the first time since 1979 that
an American ambassador” had been violently murdered.42 This was significant for two
reasons. First, Kirkpatrick and Meyers argued that Stevens had “become a local hero for
his support to the Libyan rebels” during the 2010-2011 uprising against Libyan dictator
Colonel Muammar Qaddafi.43 As such, the New York Times writers concluded that the
murder would stir up Libyan activists who supported U.S. diplomats, including “lots of
the sheiks in town and a lot of the intellectuals.”44 According to the New York Times,
pro-democracy revolutionaries “had no better friend than J. Christopher Stevens” because
of his work to “build partnerships among . . . disparate groups and guide” new fragile
democracies during difficult transition periods.45
Second, Stevens was a significant figure to diplomats. As a “career officer with
the US foreign service,” the U.S. ambassador had been responsible for many
developments between the United States and other nations.46 However, Stevens’
“friendships extended well beyond the diplomatic community;” as Harvey Morris from
the International Herald Tribune notes, he was well known for his time in the Peace
Corps, holding the delicate task of “dealing with the Palestinian Authority leadership” in
the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, and being an “American who understood and
empathized” with the Arab world.47
It is clear that Chris Stevens played a major role as a diplomat and ambassador to
the Arab world, and Steven Lee Meyers argued few could legitimately contest that
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“Stevens acted as President Barack Obama’s main interlocutor . . . in Benghazi.”48 To
cause the type of trigger in U.S. public discourse the attackers desired, Stevens’ death
would have to exemplify more than just the death of a diplomat. Stevens “had a level of
candor that was unusual for a diplomat” and was high-profile even though “he had no
pretensions” and “didn’t take himself too seriously, but he took his job very seriously.”49
As a U.S. citizen, Stevens was “a husband and father of two,” making his sacrifice for the
country the “ultimate” one; Stevens represented “extraordinary service . . . around the
globe.”50 Therefore, the lives of Stevens and other diplomats, said Mary C. Curtis from
the Washington Post, “needed to be celebrated and their deaths mourned,” especially
since the violence in Benghazi coincided “with the anniversary of a horrific terrorists
attack that – for a moment – united Americans,” only this attack “triggered not clarity of
purpose and revolve, but squabbling.”51
The attack on Benghazi by no means shredded the fabric of civil society, nor did
it approach the affective experience from September 11, 2001. Yet, the memory as a
backdrop for the attack on the U.S. Benghazi Consulate had a significant political
outcome. Even in the midst of the contentious presidential election campaign, the Obama
Administration “quietly won” congressional approval for what Eric Schmitt of the New
York Times described as a hefty budget increase in “counterterrorism aid” supposedly
already underway “before the assault that killed Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and
three other Americans.”52 This is despite the fact that the best evidence at the time of the
budget increase approval came from anonymous “officials” who could only offer that the
assault suggested “the bad guys are making plans and organizing’” and that requires
taking on “new urgency.”53
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Confusion over whether the attack on the U.S. Consulate was spontaneous or
deliberately planned was further complicated by Obama naming it an “act of terror.” This
language directly contradicted other high-ranking government officials who spoke
publically on the issue in weeks following the Rose Garden address. For example, Susan
Rice, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations argued on September 13 that “our best
judgment” is that “what happened in Benghazi was . . . a spontaneous reaction to”
demonstrations in Cairo, Egypt.54 Rice’s judgment was informed by what she described
as “the best information and the best assessment” available and it concluded “that in fact
this was not a preplanned, premeditated attack.”55 The problem with Rice’s testimony in
relation to Obama’s speech was that Rice claimed security in Benghazi was “at an
unprecedented level.”56 Miller and Birnbaum contend that accounts from “the CIA, the
FBI” and “U.S. spy agencies” suggested that there had been “no intelligence indicating
such an attack was coming.”57 If true, this was a revelation that a serious lapse of
intelligence had occurred in the face of an act of terrorism. As Kirkpatrick observes,
Obama was ultimately “faced with a range of possibilities” and “went with the one that
was politically convenient.”58 Either the President labeled the attack an act of terror and it
was a spontaneous act, or it was a planned attack the U.S. had just experienced a
substantial intelligence lapse.
Despite widespread intelligence reporting that the protest over the Youtube film
was hijacked and not led by a group of extremists, Rice held firmly that the attack on the
Benghazi Consulate was “a direct result” of the “heinous and offensive video . . . that the
U.S. government had nothing to do with, which we have made clear.”59 This presented a
Sophie’s choice for the President. Either the Obama Administration had to stick with the
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story that the attack was spontaneous in response to a film, despite mounting evidence
otherwise, or instead had to defend the position that it was a pre-meditated terrorist attack
that U.S. intelligence was unable to detect. Either way, this presented a threat to the
government’s legitimacy, nation-wide and across the globe.
Taking it to Town Hall
Unfortunately, Obama faced a more immediate source of criticism. It was the
peak of the 2012 presidential campaign, with only two and a half weeks remaining before
the election. The attack on the consulate was the type of event which Philip Rucker of the
Washington Post said traditionally creates “moments of joint resolve back home, a time
to pause from the daily bickering of partisan politics,” but because of the unique
situation, “Mitt Romney broke from that protocol.”60 Taking advantage of the volatile
political climate, campaign strategists played into the same labeling game, some
suggesting that the perpetrators of the attack were “aligned with” or “cells” for alQaeda.61 This reproduced the problem with hasty media speculation; al-Qaeda becomes a
label that, according to David Kirkpatrick of the New York Times, “can be used as a
generic term for a broad spectrum of Islamist militants” and in “heated election year
American political debate such distinctions have been lost” since “the administration has
framed the attack around the need for American outreach to the Arab world, while
Republicans have focused on the perils of American weakness there.62 Romney’s
criticisms of the Obama Administration were a “calculated gamble” that it would win
him the election, but the initial wave of vehement Republican saber-rattling occurred
“before the full gravity of the situation was known,” including confirmation that the
diplomats were actually killed.63 In a different political climate, Romney’s remark that
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Obama had failed in being “an effective leader for the U.S. interests in the Middle East”
because “the president is apologetic towards America’s enemies” might have been more
successful.64 This strategy backfired, Rachel Weiner from the Washington Post argues,
because Romney’s choice to “launch a political attack” during a shocking time “when the
United States of America is confronting the tragic death of” fallen envoys was
extraordinarily unpopular with the public.65
Instead of backpedaling, Romney “stood by his criticism” all week because he
fully believed the Obama Administration’s response was a “severe miscalculation.”66
Other Republicans stood behind framing Obama as an apologist, while Democrats
highlighted the commitment to justice and spreading liberal democracy. The “escalating
debate,” as Michael Gordon from Late Edition called it, “over the security measures that
the Obama administration established” became a battleground between the Left and
Right, where Republicans continually pressed that “it is nobody’s responsibility other
than the commander in chief” and Democrats like Hillary Clinton made “an effort to
inoculate President Obama from criticism.”67
Romney had what Andrew Rosenthal from the New York Times described as his
own Rose Garden moment on October 16, the night of the second presidential debate.
The former Massachusetts governor “thought he had a big opening and he moved in for
the kill when Mr. Obama . . . called the attack a terrorist act.”68 When Romney got his
chance and moderator Candy Crowley allowed a question about Benghazi to be asked in
a domestic policy debate, it backfired once again. Obama’s Republican opposition tried
to stick Obama to the “spontaneous story” and claimed that the President failed to call it a
terrorist attack, but as Rosenthal soberly qualifies, “whoever coached Mr. Romney on
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that question did the candidate no favors.”69 After an embarrassing intervention by
Crowley to inform Romney he was blatantly wrong, voters were left in the
“uncomfortable position of assuming that Mr. Romney either believes his own
propaganda or doesn’t care whether what he says is true.”70 This helped Obama easily
grab the upper hand because it strengthened his campaign’s narrative that Romney is
“willing to twist the truth for political gain.”71
Of the three presidential debates, the second played the most significant role in
shaping each candidate as a leader. In fact, as the New York Times argued, the town-hall
style debate was “the only prime-time national event at which ordinary citizens are
allowed to directly confront the candidates.”72 After suffering a crushing defeat in the
first debate, Obama’s “special challenge” “was to show some teeth” and take a more
confident stance on important voter-identified issues.73 Brian Knowlten of the New York
Times argued that Romney’s crucial error was framing Benghazi “as a question of
leadership, competence and transparency” because it became one of his campaign’s most
prominent “fundamental” claims on the Obama Administration.74 Ironically, these jabs at
Obama raised the Libya issue to “the forefront of the campaign,” making other important
foreign policy objectives “like the war in Afghanistan and the building confrontation with
Iran . . . secondary topics” in the New York Times and elsewhere.75 The Benghazi debate
was only a “win” for Obama insofar as Romney elevated the stature of the issue to a
point where it was pivotal in the election.
Conclusion
Obama’s Rose Garden address and the town hall debate clearly extend the social,
cultural, and political situation which emerged from September 11, 2001. While it is
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important to document the context of the two rhetorical artifacts, it is insufficient to draw
conclusions about the rhetorical strategies and goals present in each. The type of analysis
this thesis aims to produce requires an analytical framework based in rhetorical theory to
explain such strategies. A contextual analysis is necessary to discover what theories best
inform and explain Obama’s rhetoric, but it alone is only a starting point.
In the following section, a theoretical lens is developed to interpret the Rose
Garden address and town hall debate. This lens is built from synthesizing epideictic
rhetoric with public memory, influenced and assisted by prior studies of September 11,
2001. Developing an analytical framework is crucial to drawing conclusions about a text,
since it is otherwise only interpreted by a surface reading of its contents.
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CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUALIZING CONTEMPORARY PRESIDENTIAL
EPIDEICTIC RHETORIC
Preliminary reading of Obama’s speeches and their respective contexts suggested
analyses based in epideictic rhetoric. This chapter develops a theoretical framework to
guide those analyses by surveying relevant literature on ceremonial discourse and
crafting a succinct but in-depth rhetorical perspective for framing the texts. Given the
context of the events, this theoretical framework synthesizes studies of epideictic
rhetoric, foreign policy discourse and public memory to draw conclusions about the
motives and consequences of Obama’s speeches.
Aristotle’s Three Divisions of Oratory
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle identifies three categories of oratory. Each category
contains three elements—speaker, subject, and person addressed. Those being addressed
are particularly important to orators because they determine a speech’s telos and focal
point. As such, the three divisions are identified by a respective “three classes of listeners
to speeches” including judges, members of the assembly, or observers.1 The three
divisions of oratory then can be described as (1) forensic or judicial, (2) deliberative or
political, and (3) epideictic or ceremonial.
Forensic speaking closely resembles what you might witness in a court of law. A
case is presented either attacking or defending someone, and “one or other of these two
things must always be done” in a forensic situation.2 As such, judicial speeches are
concerned with the past since both attacks and their respective defenses reference events
which have already occurred. Listeners of forensic discourse make judgment on the

41

justice or injustice of defendants based on the accusations and evidence of attackers.
Succinctly, forensic oratory is delivered by accusers and defenders, providing accounts of
a past event, determined just or unjust by a judge or group of jurors.
Deliberative oratory “urges us either to do or not to do something” and is often
delivered to public assemblies.3 Policy speeches in particular exemplify the attributes of
the deliberative division. Unlike forensic speaking, political speeches are concerned with
the future, presenting arguments for or against some action based on their potential to do
good or cause harm. Listeners of political speech cast their support either in favor of or
against the speaker’s proposed outcome. In short, deliberative oratory is delivered by
individuals addressing a decision-making body, articulating the costs and benefits of
some future action or inaction, seeking support or approval by a majority of listeners.
Ceremonial discourse, in Aristotle’s view, is an “oratory of display” which “either
praises or censures somebody.”4 Epideictic speeches serve a variety of functions since
there are numerous ways to praise or blame individuals. As Jon Hesk notes, “in arguing
that epideictic oratory is concerned with praise and blame in relation to virtue and vice or
what is noble or shameful, Aristotle was clearly imagining the ceremonial contexts of
classical Greek civic religious festivals and funerals in which gods, critics, or individuals
were praised.”5 The praise or blame of subjects aim at proving them “worthy of honour or
the reverse,” and speakers approach listeners through this filter.6 Because epideictic
speakers praise or blame an object “in view of the state of things existing” at the time of a
speech’s delivery, they are primarily concerned with the present although they often find
it useful “to recall the past and to make guesses at the future.”7 Listeners of ceremonial
speeches play a role similar to yet distinct from those of forensic or deliberative nature.
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On one hand, audiences of epideictic discourses do not cast a vote for a policy nor do
they make legal judgment on the innocence or guilt of a party. However, as Aristotle
notes, to praise an individual “is in one respect akin to urging a course of action” because
it encourages audiences to acknowledge and accept the praise as speakers have forwarded
it.8
While it is important to understand the distinctions between the three divisions of
oratory, the overlap is equally important. Each genre has distinct end in view, but these
ends are accomplished through the support of the means of their counterparts. For
example, consider that deliberative speakers seek primarily to establish the “expediency
or the harmfulness of a proposed course of action” on either the grounds that it will do
good or it will do harm.9 In order to demonstrate that accepting a course of action will
bring good, a proposal must also be interpreted as just and honorable, although these are
“subsidiary and relative to” the main contemplation.10 Forensic speakers in a court of law
may also implicate the present and future. Decisions rendered about the past may set a
precedent for how laws are interpreted and applied in the future, and the stigma attached
to a (not) guilty verdict certainly affects the way individuals are honored or shamed by
their surrounding communities. Ceremonial orators may not consider whether their acts
“have been expedient or not, but often make it a ground of actual praise” that they have
neglected their “own interest to do what was honourable.”11 Epideictic discourse may
encourage a later action or reimagine the meaning of justice altogether. Summarily,
speeches in any of the three genres must command the absolute or relative greatness or
smallness of their praise or blame, their proposals for action, or their accusations or
defenses.12 In short, speakers set goals for themselves depending on their purpose for
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audiences; deliberative oratory decides what is expedient; forensic oratory decides what
is just; and epideictic oratory praises or blames with eloquently articulated value
systems.13
Aristotle was clairvoyant when he observed the importance of audience to the
genres of oratory. The centrality of audience is crucial to Aristotle’s taxonomy. In each
genre, the needs of audiences are distinct and therefore a speaker’s strategies for
satisfying those needs are distinct as well. Forensic speeches act on the need to determine
innocence or guilt, deliberative speeches on the need to plan for future actions, but what
of epideictic speeches? An audience’s needs that conjure up ceremonial speeches are
often definitional instead of judgmental. According to Aristotle, speakers must “take into
account the nature of” their “particular audience when making a speech of praise” since if
audiences esteem “a given quality,” then the subject of praise must be emblematic of that
quality for listeners to understand it as speakers intend.14 In other words, epideictic
rhetoric (re)defines the state of existing things for an audience instead of urging them to
make judgments on them. Certainly listeners may make judgments on the subject,
particularly if their new understanding is persuasive. Audiences may also disagree with a
speaker’s praise or blame. However, the primary role of listeners in ceremonial oratory is
to understand the object as speakers define it, and praise or blame are the vehicles
bridging a speaker’s definition with an audience’s understanding. Summarily, epideictic
rhetoric satisfies the needs of both speakers and audiences; it provides orators with a tool
to communicate how and why events have occurred while granting audiences a means of
understanding them.
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For Aristotle, epideictic rhetoric was an essential component of Athenian life.
Contemporary rhetoric has produced situations much more complex than those Aristotle
encountered in ancient Athens. While Aristotle’s ceremonial oratory is foundational to
describing the epideictic genre, it lacks the meticulousness needed to describe rhetoric in
modern discursive arenas. This is not because Aristotle lacked precision or breadth; it is
simply an outdated perspective that fails to account for the variety of ceremonial
occasions which have become commonplace in contemporary rhetoric. The audiences are
larger, the distribution of information is faster, and channels for consuming texts have
evolved. Therefore, critiques of contemporary epideictic rhetoric are guided but not
completed by the assumption that all ceremonial artifacts contain some degree of praise
and/or blame, but these two terms alone do not explain the nuanced patterns evident in
modern public discourse.
Characteristics of Modern Epideictic Texts
Celeste M. Condit updates Aristotle’s work on epideictic rhetoric, arguing that
contemporary epideictic situations extend far beyond the “ceremonial” occasions he
described. Epideictic situations, Condit argues, emerge when some distressing event
creates a set of needs for both the community involved and its leadership.15 That there is
a need on behalf of both communities and their leadership is important for understanding
the kinds of epideictic situations in which presidents—like Obama—find themselves in.
As Chapter 2 outlined, the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi created a climate of
uncertainty and apprehension among U.S. citizens. The brewing chaos and fear produced
a need for definition and understanding. In situations like Benghazi, leaders must lead
and communities need leadership.
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Condit articulates that epideictic rhetoric is studied from three general
perspectives, message-centered, speaker-centered, and audience-centered. Messagecentered perspectives orient themselves around the prevalence of praise or blame of an
object, event, or person.16 Speaker-centered perspectives prioritize a speaker’s long-term
intentions over the immediate interests of their audiences. In other words, there is a focus
on the possibility that leaders use epideictic speeches to “make the populace more
amenable to later arguments on more focused topics.”17 Finally, there are two audience
perspectives. One pays attention to “the ‘judgment’ performed by the audience, the other
on the ‘experience’ had by the audience.”18 Synthesizing these general perspectives,
Condit offers three functional pairs illustrating how exigencies are dealt with by speakers
and their audiences. In each pair, the first term represents the needs arising for leaders,
the second the corresponding needs for their communities. These pairs
“define/understand,” “shape/share a sense of community,” and “display/entertain” should
not be understood as an attempt to “fence in the territory of epideictic,” but instead guide
critics in investigating the “characteristics shared by epideictic speeches.”19
Condit’s first functional pair, defining/understanding, explains how leaders
portray a volatile situation to a community. When a troubling event occurs, epideictic
speakers explain the issue through the lens of an audience’s key values and beliefs.20 If
audiences interpret an event through a backdrop saturated by important familiar
terminology, it soothes their confusion over the issue and provides them a sense of
comfort. In essence, audiences are “tamed” by speakers’ explanations, and the speakers
earn “the right to define the meaning of past experience.”21 Ceremonial speakers then
apply the meaning of a past experience to a present one, thereby wielding the power of
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emphasizing those values in order to create paths to the future. The strategy of defining
events in the present through the lens of the past, if successful, gives audiences “a hint at
how they might judge what is to come.”22
In defining events, epideictic texts often rely on public memory. A funeral oration
is designed to comfort friends, family and loved ones by celebrating the life of the
deceased. Campaign speeches remind citizens of the past successes and failures of those
in power. Commemorations of any kind celebrate the bravery or treachery of spectacular
individuals. This is the case, Edward Casey notes, because public memory “points both
backward—to the vanished event or person—and forward (by means of the resolute wish
to preserve the memory of the event or person, or even to act on it).”23 Collective
remembering operates through the “imagistic, gesticulatory, and linguistic practices” it
engages in.24
Presidents are uniquely prone to engage in collective remembering. Denise
Bostdorff argues that presidents “often turn to the resources of memoria or shared
recollections of the past” in order “to explain an event, renew community, and
demonstrate leadership.”25 When troubling events occur, “epideictic rhetors may be
especially tempted to draw on collective memories as a way of uniting an audience that is
highly fragmented both demographically and attitudinally.”26 These are the linguistic
practices of eloquent leaders. Ceremonial rhetoric renews the shared identity of
communities through what Bostdorff calls “the creative performance of memory.”27
When speakers create a coherent meaning for their audience, they have achieved
what Condit calls “definitional authority.”28 Speakers’ stature can offer a metric for the
breadth of how far their definition reaches. Presidents in particular speak to a large,
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national audience. David Zarefsky articulates that “because of his [sic] prominent
political position and his access to the means of communication, the president, by
defining a situation, might be able to shape the context in which events . . . are viewed by
the public.”29 Audience members become “publically tamed” by the explanation rhetors
offer in the aftermath of a troubling event. A troubling event often presents the
opportunity for leaders to both praise and blame. That is, speakers obtain the power to
prescribe objects relevant to the situation as good or evil via the audience’s key values
and beliefs they have accessed in defining it. Rhetors themselves become the gatekeepers
of their audiences’ most sacred values. Summarily, presidents purposefully reach into the
past for value systems that form the foundations of moral screens that define present
situations, seeking to influence an audience’s understanding of them.
Epideictic speakers define troubling events using language understandable to their
audience. Not only must the language used be familiar to their listeners, it must resonate
with them as well. There are a variety of ways speakers may choose to characterize an
event. Presidents’ rhetorical strategies are influenced by the exigencies which call them
forward. As such an event, September 11 has developed significant influence over U.S.
citizens in the past decade. Michael J. Hyde characterizes the rhetorical sway of
September 11 as a “gut-wrenching spectacle and an awesome symbolic act,” a “vivid
epideictic display” embodying American vulnerability through national loss.30 The World
Trade Center, the symbol of U.S. economic primacy, crumbled to the ground. An airliner
crashing into the Pentagon demonstrated that the most powerful military in the world was
unable to detect or prevent an attack at its own headquarters. Even the date of the attack
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was eye-opening, it occurred on 9-1-1, the number which signifies “state of emergency”
to U.S. citizens.
It seemed natural given the date of the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi
that it too would become signified by September 11. A diplomatic structure was assaulted
and American lives were taken in the process. Intelligence gathering by a country that
takes pride in its counter-terrorism operations failed and the country lost four lives as a
result. As Chapter 2 discussed, the date of the attack was largely responsible for the
uncertainty looming over the public because of immediate inference that the attack was
connected to its legacy in recent U.S. history. These instant connections by the public and
the media demonstrate that the resonance and familiarity of September 11 was alive and
well eleven years after the initial attacks.
Leaders achieve definitional authority in ceremonial discourse by claiming either
moral or political authority. Choosing definitions is, as Zarefksy argues, “to plead a
cause” devoid of explicit claims but offered as if they were “natural and
uncontroversial.”31 This is crucial to overcoming inevitable political opposition. After all,
there are always interests at stake in how situations are framed because that determines
how they are translated for constituents. As Zarefsky notes, this is how definitions affect
audiences; they highlight certain elements of situations for use in arguments while
obscuring others, influence whether citizens take notice of situations and how they handle
them, and invite moral judgments about the circumstances and individuals involved.32
The second functional pair, “shaping/sharing a sense of community,” illustrates
the formation and sustainability of communities through traditional, long-standing value
systems. Condit maintains that epideictic rhetoric is particularly important to the
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sustainability of communities because forensic and deliberative speech “pit two sides
against each other,” meaning “the focus of the event is inevitably division” instead of
“unity and sharing.”33 Ceremonial discourse does not make arguments through refutation
or competition; rather, it creates “opportunities for expressing and reformulating our
shared heritage.”34
Communities of any size from small groups, such as a family grieving for a
departed loved one, to entire nations, as in the case of the Benghazi attack, need a means
for identifying themselves as a people. Epideictic speakers synthesize symbols, values,
and myths to construct a “heritage” forming the underlying principles of a community’s
identity.35 Communities’ identities can be formed through narrow, contained texts or
broad ubiquitous ones. For example, U.S. citizens may identify through well-defined
objects, such as the country’s flag or the acronym “USA.” However, the same audience
may identify more closely with its principal values, such as freedom and justice. In either
case, ceremonial speakers may point to referents of their audiences’ as a means of
identifying the recipients of their messages. This mode of identification overlaps with and
contributes to “definition/understanding,” Condit says, because “community renews its
conception of itself and of what is good by explaining what it has previously held to be
good and by working through the relationships of those past values and beliefs to new
situations.”36 It is the role of epideictic speakers then to “help discover what the event
means to the community, and what the community will come to be in the face of the new
event.”37
Condit also notes that there is potentially a dark underbelly to the formulation and
sustainability of communities through heritage. A community’s discursive norms
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contribute to the formation of its boundaries by highlighting the differences between that
community and those existing outside of it. For if there is a community defined by its
members, there must also be individuals excluded from it because they do not esteem the
characteristics of the heritage which has been tied to what is good; in fact, they may be
painted as opposing it. As such, “definitions of community are often advanced by
contrast with ‘others’ outside of the community.”38 The result of this phenomenon is that
“we constitute ourselves as good (necessarily) by ranging ourselves against ‘the bad.’”39
That is, in the dialectic of “good” and “evil,” speakers portray the community as “good”
and “others” outside as evil. In many cases, the labeling of individuals as outsiders to
communities is noncontroversial because “there is usually no overt conflict,” and “the
promotion of individual values in the abstract” is seemingly benevolent because “we are
trained to accept a wide range of values, and to see conflict only in their relationships to
each other and to specific decisions.”40 This was certainly the case in the aftermath of the
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and as Chapter 2 illustrated, the
same tone emerged in the aftermath of the attack in Benghazi.
Given the complexities of 21st century politics, partisanship has further polarized
the divide between the political Left and Right in the United States. This polarization is
evident in the congressional gridlock that has increasingly slogged congress over the last
decade. However, there are broad value systems that define the heritage of the U.S. as a
whole with the power to unify the nation-wide community. For example, the notion that
the U.S. is a defender of “freedom” traces back to the nation’s origin, a traverse across
the Atlantic Ocean for religious and political freedom from the British monarchy.
Likewise, the concept of “justice” is an ideograph of U.S. culture. Still, both of these
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terms lack concrete definition. It is the role of leaders then to make meaning out of the
values that form the nation-state and its community.
As David Hoogland Noon articulates, “historical analogies offer cognitive
frameworks through which we might evaluate new information and experience, but they
also trigger emotional, even subconscious associations that are equally capable of
inspiring, attracting, and recruiting support for a particular political decision.”41 In times
of conflict, leaders often paint the U.S. as defenders of freedom and the pursuit of justice.
George W. Bush frequently alluded to the legacy of World War II in the aftermath of
September 11, 2001. For example, in his Address to Joint Session of Congress on
September 20, 2001, Bush said that:
On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our
country. Americans have known wars -- but for the past 136 years, they have been
wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the
casualties of war -- but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning.
Americans have known surprise attacks -- but never before on thousands of
civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day -- and night fell on a
different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.42
According to Noon, this connection highlights the general tendency of presidents to
invoke “the ‘lessons of history’ to insinuate that the United States has been reliving the
tribulations of the ‘good war’” for freedom and justice, and ever since the “‘lessons of
September 11’ and the ‘lessons of history’ are seemingly coterminous.”43
September 11 posed a substantial threat to the core of American values. It has
become engraved in the U.S. as the go-to metaphor when troubling events occur. Noon
argues that Bush “enjoyed countless opportunities to summon the legacy of World War II
as the sanctifying touch for his global campaign against terrorism” because September
11, 2001 represented ‘our’ Pearl Harbor.”44 Bush’s analogies, Noon argues, “in the
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months immediately following the attacks . . . have been extended (and distended) in
every imaginable direction;” they “attuned to all the appropriate rhetorical tones,” and
saturated “public appearances with reminders of the moment’s historical gravity.”45 The
institutions of freedom and justice were undoubtedly vulnerable in the aftermath of the
attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.
Historical analogies play a significant role in all types of oratory, but they serve
the needs of presidential epideictic speech profoundly. They are not only “frameworks
through which we might evaluate new information and experience, but they also trigger
emotional, even subconscious associations that are equally inspiring, attracting, and
recruiting support for a particular political decision.”46 This explains why presidents
satisfy deliberative ends with epideictic means. While "popular nostalgia for World War
II serves potentially innumerable functions for ordinary citizens, corporate advertisers,
scholars, and political pundits,” the “good war” has since been consistently reappropriated as September 11 “not simply to justify . . . policy aims, but more
importantly as a cultural project as well as an ongoing gesture of self-making;”
summoning its memory for ethos-building and “appealing to the anguished national quest
for meaning amid catastrophic loss.”47 Succinctly, historical analogies are important
rhetorical devices for leaders to gain adherence from their audiences, and the memory of
September 11 is part of a broader, ongoing cultural project that ensures public support of
the state in a war between good and evil.
While there have been several policies implemented in the post-9/11 environment,
its memory has independently served as a definition, identity, and moral vision for
subsequent events. James Jasinski argues that although “policy proposals are developed
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to help curb these problems, we also encounter a substantial amount of epideictic
discourse—from speeches by the present . . . that encourages a reaffirmation of core
values.”48 In other words, presidents must constantly reaffirm the “good war” because it
promotes the value systems which have the best chance at audience adherence and
eventually action. Summarily, Noon concludes, leaders invoke historical analogies of
freedom and justice “as a cultural project as well as an ongoing gesture of self-making”
to shape the nation-wide community.49
It is no coincidence that Bush, Obama, and other political leaders have used
September 11 as an access point for defining both the U.S. as a community and the
outsiders who oppose it. As discussed in Chapter 2, instances of violence subsequent to
September 11, 2001 have been framed as an extension of the original attacks because it is
a filter accessible to the community at large, transcending bitter partisan politics with
which the country has become all too familiar with. When presidents make epideictic
appeals through these frames, it is “noncontroversial” because of the immense difficulty
it requires to challenge them. When Presidents define troubling events as nation-wide
concerns rooted in strong value-based claims, it becomes easy for opponents to be labeled
as threats to the community. As John Murphy argues, this strategy reduces the risk of
political obtrusion from opponents because challenging “the president’s epideictic
appeals is to question his [sic] right to define the people,” painting the picture that
dissenters pose “a threat to the nation” and violate the occasion.50 Only ideologically
extreme politicians “dare take the momentous step of challenging the moral authority of
the president.”51 Ultimately, Murphy says, opponents of presidents’ epideictic appeals are
cast as “un-American” and banished from their respective communities.52

54

Even when rhetors succeed in shaping communities and sharing their norms, their
task is incomplete. Speakers offer definitions of troubling events which they see fit for
the communities they address, but they must also demonstrate their leadership skills
through mastery of the values and beliefs they wish to instill upon artifacts and
audiences. This set of needs describes Condit’s third functional pair, display/entertain. In
ceremonial discourse, speakers need to demonstrate eloquence, “the combination of truth,
beauty, and power in human speech” to which listeners can stretch their “capacities and
identities in the human quest for improvement.”53 Eloquent language gives audiences a
means to recognize and accept leadership in troubling times because it transforms their
daily experiences into “grand, noble” ones.54 That is, if leaders are perceived by their
audiences to know truth, recognize and wield beauty, and manage power then they stand
a good chance of “being a desirable leader for the community.”55
Epideictic rhetoric serves the important function of developing and teaching
public morality. Orators frame issues to communities in ways appearing to convey sound
judgment and demonstrate discernment on practical matters, inviting them to accept the
speakers’ interpretation. As Gerard Hauser argues, ceremonial speakers must possess
noble qualities and present them eloquently to their audiences.56 Ceremonial discourse
therefore not only defines events and shapes communities, but it actively teaches
communities who they are. Hauser notes that “only skilled arguers” can possess dynamis,
or the “power of observing the available means of persuasion” for a given occasion.57 If
orators can define troubling events through the lens of shaped communities, then they can
display leadership over issues of public morality since they have shown why something
has happened and who we are moving forward. When orators exhibit leadership over
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noble qualities, Hauser says, they directly benefit “the community since, ‘if virtue is a
faculty of beneficence, the highest kinds of it must be those which are most useful to
others,’” and in particular “acts of courage and justice are the most laudatory, since they
embody virtues that aid the whole community.”58
Even if leaders speak virtuous language to their respective communities, their
form requires complementary content. Hauser defines the teaching role of epideictic “by
assigning its practitioners the responsibility for telling the story of lived virtue.”59 In other
words, leaders cannot simply offer praise of the beliefs and values held dearly to their
communities, they must embody them and bring them to life. However, this embodiment
is not just the story of heroic deeds. Instead, according to Hauser, the embodiment of
values is “the expression in words of the eminence of a man’s [sic] good qualities”
displaying “his actions as the product of such qualities.”60 Therefore, “the subjects of
epideictic rhetoric are not themselves the teachers of society,” rather; leaders are the
teachers because “the moral of their acts emerges not in what” the hero did, “but in the
storyteller’s province of how their deeds are narrated.”61 This is precisely what Aristotle
meant when he said “to praise a man [sic] is in one respect akin to urging a course of
action.”62 That is, bearing witness to narratives of valor and virtue reveals the lives of
“exemplary citizens,” implicitly asking society to follow the hero’s footsteps by urging
“manifestation of their communal aspirations.”63
The process of teaching communities about the virtuous deeds of others is what
Condit labels entertainment because it stretches the daily experiences of listeners by
encouraging them to emulate the grand, noble narratives displayed by their leaders.
Leaders display eloquence and audiences gain leaders. Condit’s use of “entertainment”
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certainly explains the attention-grabbing performative nature of epideictic rhetoric, but it
seems out of place when accounting for the active learning that takes place in ceremonial
speeches. Instead, “manifestation” seems more appropriate since it implies that leaders
display leadership through virtuous stories, and listeners are persuaded to emulate the
expressed heroic deeds.
Condit’s three functional pairs are useful for understanding the epideictic genre
because they explore common characteristics in ceremonial texts. However, it is mistaken
to assume that the three pairs are rigid. Instead, it is better to understand them as three
mutually reinforcing families of characteristics that often overlap in any given ceremonial
oration. That is, leaders define troubling events in ways that are understood by their
audiences because they are framed around pre-existing beliefs or values. Leaders’
definitions come from an authoritative position and therefore wield the power to tell
communities who they are and what they stand for. When presidents artfully display their
leadership over the beliefs and values of their communities, they inspire citizens to
emulate the good deeds of others. All three functional pairs interpenetrate one another;
they are part of one larger acclamation, the on-going process of ceremonial oratories.
Summarily, epideictic texts engage in profoundly constitutive activities; its meaning
proves essential in shaping and teaching community norms and producing its leadership;
and audiences experience, understand, and celebrate its virtues for political conduct.
Ceremonial discourse, Hauser concludes, is a “rhetorical space where community is
invented and shared in performances of virtue through stores of significant individuals
and momentous events” and are “worth imitating because they teach lessons for making
society itself more noble” by defining and articulating public morality.64
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Crisis Rhetoric in Epideictic Form
Although there are many forms of epideictic discourse, crisis rhetoric carries a
particular urgency in its very nature. Most crises threaten not only lives and property, but
also our very sense of community, the understanding of who we are. Some of the
troubling events which presidents address through epideictic rhetoric are genuine crises.
Certainly that was the case for the attacks on September 11, 2001. It is no surprise then
that the media and Obama explained the Benghazi attacks through the lens of September
11; doing so carried over some of the emotion and memory of those earlier attacks and
applies them to a more immediate situation.
Bonnie Dow identifies three defining characteristics of presidential crisis rhetoric.
First, presidents tend to assert their “possession of ‘New Facts’ about a situation” in order
to define it as a crisis.65 Even when the general public is already aware of a troubling
event, there are often looming questions and a corresponding set of viral rumors
surrounding it. Second, presidents may offer a “melodramatic comparison between the
pure motives of the United States and the evil motives of the enemy.”66 These
comparisons are the type of Manichean notions of good vs. evil, saviors vs. barbariansdiscourse that defines who is inside and outside of the (nation-wide) community. Finally,
presidents tend to shift troubling issues from “practical, political” contexts to “moral,
ethical” ones.67 This notion echoes Condit on the formation and sustainability of
community and Hauser on teaching public morality. That is, epideictic crisis rhetoric
beats the belly-drum of community ethics to reinforce messages that may eventually
translate into deliberative calls for action, but are ceremonial in their immediacy. As
Mary Stuckey articulates, presidents clarify national crises because they are “the nation’s
chief storyteller,” their “interpreter-in-chief” because they “tell us stories about
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ourselves” suggesting “what sort of people we are” and “how we are constituted as a
community.”68
September 11 has drastically changed the way leaders define foreign policy crises.
A bipartisan consensus has since emerged that the “9/11 attacks” marked the beginning
of “an interventionist ‘war on terror,’” drawing attention to “the significant threats to our
national security posed by . . . terrorism.”69 U.S. foreign policy has undergone dramatic
changes. As Michael Mazarr argues in Foreign Affairs, the world has experienced
“profound shifts in U.S. foreign and defense policy as a result” of violence committed by
non-state actors requiring “multi-dimensional operations composed of such components
as political/diplomatic, humanitarian intelligence, economic development, and
security.”70 The post-Cold War period can easily be described as a lost era in foreign
policy because it was a mostly peaceful time for U.S. interests. Clinton’s New World
Order was a period of indeterminism because the only metaphor describing conflicts the
U.S. was engaged in was a series of “nation-building” operations. Our “enemies” were
weak, fragile states. After September 11, our enemies were the terrorizing individuals
taking sanctuary in them.
According to Dow, exigency is crucial to crisis rhetoric because crisis speeches
are “informed by an understanding of the differing exigencies that give rise to it.”71 As
she further notes, “the most fruitful way for critics to analyze crisis rhetoric is to begin
with an understanding of how the rhetoric functions to respond to the exigence created by
the situation.”72 Crisis discourse often occurs because of one of two pre-dominant
exigencies. First, crisis speeches can be justificatory, where orators focus on “explanation
and rationalization of military retaliation.”73 Justificatory crisis speeches are therefore
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deliberative, since it is “the President’s announcement of American action that led to the
situations being perceived as crises.”74
In other cases, as Dow says, crisis rhetoric is consummatory, or when presidents
are “reacting to what the news media had already treated as an event with high potential
for generating conflict.”75 Consummatory rhetoric is pre-dominantly epideictic since it
functions to “allow the audience to reach a communal understanding of the events which
have occurred” in contrast to justificatory discourse that seeks to legitimize “the
expediency of action taken in an effort to gain public support” for a policy or law.76
Regardless of whether crisis speeches are consummatory or justificatory, there are
generally both deliberative and epideictic characteristics present where one will be more
prevalent than another. Exigency is central to analyzing crisis speeches because the
dominance of either type “is tied to the function that the discourse fulfills in a
situation.”77
From the discussion in Chapter 2, the rhetorical environment of the attacks on the
U.S. Consulate in Benghazi can be easily described as one calling for consummatory
rhetoric, “where presidential discourse initially constituted the only official reply made
by the American government” instead of functioning as the “very beginning of a larger,
overt military retaliation taken by the government of the U.S.”78 The important
distinction between consummatory and justificatory crisis rhetoric is how each responds
to the exigence calling them forward. Important exigencies for crisis rhetoric are “the
events, the needs of the audience, and the purposes of the rhetor.”79 These exigencies
neatly fit into Condit’s functional pairs: a definition and understanding of the event, the
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needs of audiences addressed, and the presidents’ leadership over the event constituting
their purpose for being an authoritative speaker.
The attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center in 2001 have become, as
Gary Woodward argues, a specific form of crisis rhetoric: a set of occasions for
“endlessly recycled narratives of American virtue vehemently argued” by presidents.80
These arguments are rooted in “nationalistic piety,” functioning “rhetorically as the
legitimizing agent” for foreign policy, veiling its political rational beneath the veneer of
“moral and historic inevitability.”81 Much like the failure of Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on
Poverty, the War on Terror has no definitive end-point. Therefore, “we relish the
certainty that our wounded nation will seek its revenge against alien forces around the
globe” as long as there are enemies to vanquish.82
Presidential reaffirmation of the values sustaining the moral and historic
inevitability of September 11 is significant for the construction of crises. Casey
articulates that “a given public memory is constituted from within a particular historical
circumstance, usually a crisis of some sort.”83 The initial attacks on the World Trade
Center resulted in an “instantaneous installation of a new public memory” that was
“regarded en masse.”84 September 11 is a unique memory in this regard. In the aftermath
of the original attack, Bush held a ninety percent approval rating, what the New York
Times described as “the highest rating for a president ever recorded by the Gallup polling
group.”85 Ever since, the memory of September 11 has been fundamental for how
presidents have defined conflicts the U.S. has engaged in.
Eulogizing the Patriots
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Chapter 2 noted that the situation Obama faced when he spoke at the Rose Garden
was not only a crisis, but it also involved the loss of American lives. The President
acknowledged this and it was seemingly appropriate that part of Obama’s address was
eulogistic. Crisis rhetoric is pre-dominantly epideictic in this case, so the marriage of
eulogy and crisis is rather seamless in Obama’s speech. Obama’s speech was fitting for
the occasion because U.S. lives were lost in a crisis.
Although crisis rhetoric appears in many forms, eulogies are particularly
important for leaders to achieve the functions of epideictic speaking. As Dow notes, “in
the case of eulogies, the community has experienced a loss, and its most basic need is to
assign meaning to that event and to discover how to proceed following it.”86 Even when
“the majority of the audience is not personally involved” in crisis situations, “they still
feel a sense of confusion, a need to understand the meaning of the event for the nation as
a whole and to know how the nation will proceed” forward.87 Eulogies present orators
opportunities to flex their rhetorical muscle by leading the nation forward from tragedy
and lighting the path to the future. In short, eulogies perform the consummatory function
of epideictic rhetoric because they explain tragic events to the nation-wide community
instead of legitimizing the actions of the individuals being celebrated.
Presidents tend to have at least one of three strategies in mind when performing
eulogies. First, as Dow argues, leaders will “dissociate the nation from responsibility for
the crisis.”88 This is a necessary component of eulogies because it persuades the
community that their anger should “not be directed at the government or themselves.”89
Leaders can achieve dissociation if they depict the deceased U.S. citizens as helpless
victims and their killers as amoral. Second, leaders “place the event within a value-laden
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context of similar situations.”90 In other words, presidents draw on similar troubling
events from the past and use them to guide their explanation of the present situation. This
is how leaders make the nation-wide community “feel comforted, restored, and unified
after a disruptive experience.”91 Finally, according to Dow, presidents may “urge
perseverance in present policy rather than changes in policy.”92 Again, it is certainly
possible for deliberative elements to appear in epideictic discourse although leaders may
not be seeking action in the immediacy of the speech. Summarily, Dow’s three strategies
for performing eulogies strongly reflect Condit’s three functional pairs. That is, leaders
offer citizens a particular understanding of an event that dissociates the U.S. from guilty
involvement; places the event in a specific value-laden context that aligns with the
community’s identity; and urges perseverance in their ideas, demonstrating eloquence
through their words of wisdom.
Eulogies are not just understanding, dissociation, and value-laden. They play an
active role in teaching good citizenship. This is because eulogies, Kendall Phillips argues,
are “not simply to memorialize an individual but to pass on cultural ethics by describing
exemplary lives and deaths.”93 When orators speak to audiences about civic virtue, it
must be in a language common to listeners but ethically important. Epideictic rhetoric, as
Hauser notes, “commemorates noble deeds” and “also can inculcate a common
vocabulary of excellence among its witnesses.”94 Therefore, eulogies not only frame the
way citizens experience an individual’s life, but also how they ought to experience their
own in the future.
As Amos Kiewe articulates, “eulogies are temporal discourses meant to construct
timeless memories and consequently seek to construct future space for such memories.”95
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Presidents are particularly “concerned with their heritage” and “are prone to the practice
of conditioning memories.”96 Valorizing civic heroes is an avenue which presidents
reinvent “the American myth” which “is not often about historical truth but about
rhetorical truth.”97 Eulogy is thus a performance “to create a sense of community”
through the ritual of memory work.98 In short, eulogies foster “a rhetorical space where
community is invented and shared in performances of virtue through stories of significant
individuals and momentous events” that are “worth imitating because they teach lessons
for making society itself more noble.”99 Eulogized Americans become a concrete
representation of “renewed hope for a country and a future,” and “their optimism toward
making a difference in the world . . . acts as cynicism’s anti-matter.”100
Eulogies are also substantially influenced by public memory. As noted earlier,
funeral orations create timeless memories of the individuals who have passed away.
Kiewe articulates that “as epideictic speech, funeral orations are performative, as they
rely on noble acts and thoughts and their ritual function is to create ‘a sense of
community among its participants,’” and public memory is “a function of the ritual of
eulogies.”101 Deceased individuals are not always remembered for their actions. Instead,
eulogized persons are often remembered as idealist representations of particular values.
In this way, eulogies evoke emotions because they are “an affiliative bond between
perfected action and human response” and thus the memories in eulogies “can be
harnessed to rhetorically instruct, educate, guide, and motivate” the audience.102
Succinctly, eulogies perform the ritualistic function of epideictic rhetoric because they
guide citizens to act the same way idealistic others have before them. By doing so,
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eulogies construct narratives that “can and so invent a persona and a myth and thus can
condition future discourses and accounts.”103
Personas can be invented in a variety of ways. One important way personas are
developed is the process of historical individuals about who little was known
transforming into public figures. As Cindy Koenig Richards argues, by associating these
individuals “with traditional US symbols and heroes and by displaying” them “as a model
of civic values such as courage, duty, and progress,” speakers offer epideictic
performances that are “aesthetically appealing and culturally resonant,” evoking the
American identity and calling upon a historic past to provide a “model of civic action”
through “traditional vocabularies and values.”104 Eulogists often invent personas and
attach them to the individuals they are grieving over. When presidents eulogize
individuals they deem heroes, their remembrance focuses less on the particular actions of
those individuals and more on the ways they represent ideal citizenship and civic duty.
Campaigning to the Voters
Obama’s Rose Garden Address is easily characterized as an epideictic text. The
speech both eulogizes the loss of a U.S. citizen and soothes the confusion over a
troubling event for the nation-wide audience. At first glance, the town hall debate
between the President and Governor Romney may appear to lack the traditional
characteristics of epideictic rhetoric. With regards to its format, the debate was a series of
question and answer periods with a moderator to keep time. Although there was an
immediate audience in attendance, the target audience was U.S. citizens across the nation
watching in real time. Further, the topics discussed were pre-dominantly deliberative
issues. Each candidate sought to differentiate himself from the opponent by highlighting
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his own distinct political agendas for each of the issues conjured by concerned audience
members. Above all else, the candidates prepared to appear on national television to
enhance their reputations as leaders who made themselves more politically available to
U.S. citizens and politicians on both sides of the aisle.
The ultimate goal for the candidates in the town hall debate was to convince U.S.
citizens, voters in particular, that they were best-suited to make expedient decisions for
the nation as its leader. In order to do so, each candidate needed to demonstrate their
confidence in and knowledge of important and urgent political issues. These political
issues composed the molecules of the candidates’ larger moral vision for the country, the
overall platform they promised to bring with their nomination as President of the United
States. Candidates’ larger moral vision of the nation reflects what Robert Rowland means
by the contemporary “heavily theatrical character of American politics in general and
presidential debates in particular.”105
While these attributes of the town hall debate seemingly warrant a deliberative
classification, there are important epideictic elements present as well. Recall that in
Aristotle’s taxonomy the role of the audience in epideictic rhetoric is to make judgment
on a speaker’s praise or blame of an object. In the case of a debate that has a “winner”
and “loser,” the speakers praise themselves while “blaming” their opponents. Obama and
Romney needed to make voters believe they could remedy the nation’s current problems
while constructing a caricature of their opponent that suggested those complications
would continue or grow worse. Certainly this required both speakers to articulate a wellreasoned, well-researched policy platform. However, the presidential nominees would
first need to win the election before those deliberative realities were even possibilities.
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Most significant to the immediate rhetorical situation for Obama and Romney, then, was
their self-promotion as a credible, desirable leader.
The significant relationship between the deliberative and epideictic elements of
the town hall debate between Obama and Romney reflect the broader genre of rhetorical
situations that Michael C. Leff and Gerald P. Mohrmann isolate as campaign oratory.
Leff and Mohrmann contend that campaign orations are best understood as epideictic
because in essence they address the honorability of candidates, asking for judgment from
the audience on whether they deserve to become the President of the United States. This
is the case because the deliberative elements of the occasion, the policies and laws, are
used as a means to achieve an epideictic ends of self-honor and worthiness of leading the
nation.106 Campaign speeches contain elements of expediency, but speakers are not
inherently expedient or inexpedient. Although campaign orations do address policy
issues, the aim is not to urge the audience to adopt those policies; but rather, to enhance
the individual ethos of the candidate. Speakers are not just or unjust, expedient or
inexpedient; rather, they are worthy of honor or the reverse..
Paul Rosenthal identifies this phenomenon as the distinction between “nonpersonal and personal persuasion.”107 Non-personal persuasion refers to occasions where
speakers attempt “to influence audience attitudes about a particular issue, and ethos is
important insofar as it lends credence to the substance of the argument.”108 In other
words, the object of non-personal persuasive texts is something external to speakers; the
focal point of the text is some platform item and the candidates’ credibility makes that
agenda more intelligible and likeable to their audiences.
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Personal persuasion, on the other hand, reverses this process. The focal point,
Rosenthal argues, is the speaker, where the message becomes a vehicle for enhancing
ethos. This means that while “the ostensible purpose of a given speech may be to gain
acceptance of a particular policy . . . the actual purpose is to gain votes for the
candidate.”109 In any given policy-oriented speech, speakers need both a strong ethos and
a relatable, sensible platform. Sometimes speakers’ ethos enhances the desirability of
their policies, and others the desirability of the policies enhances their ethos. Although
campaign orations can therefore be classified as either deliberative or epideictic, the town
hall debate is uniquely situated to be characterized as personal persuasion and ceremonial
since, as Leff and Mohrmann conclude, “the treatment of issues is subsidiary to the
purpose of creating a general identification between the speaker and the audience;” the
ultimate objective of campaign oratory is not to pass legislation, but is instead
“ingratiation.”110
Epideictic campaign speeches must develop their ethos through artistic displays of
leadership. Describing presidential leadership generally, Woodward argues that
presidents demonstrate their leadership through an “unremitting chain of symbolic
acts.”111 Through their use of active, controlling verbs, presidents are given purpose by
their promises to affirm, determine, direct, or order decisions. This purpose secures
presidents’ place as “the master of significant events,” the arbiter of which decisions are
relevant and when they are made.112
Assuming that campaign speeches serve epideictic needs of speakers, the
effectiveness of the speeches, according to Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca,
“cannot be measured by the degree of probability attributed to the accepted argument, but
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rather by the obstacles overcome by the action and the sacrifices and choices it leads to
and which can be justified by the adherence.”113 In other words, election speeches cannot
be determined by the likelihood that audiences agree with candidates’ platforms. Instead,
critics should pay attention to the obstacles speakers must overcome to meet their goals.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca argue that this is the “existence of an interval . . .
between the time of adherence and the time of action it was designed to stimulate.”114
This does not occur in a vacuum. It is part of an ongoing process where speakers
continually build adherence with their audiences. Presidential campaigns are prime
examples where “adherence gained by a speech can always advantageously be
reinforced” because slogans and other signifiers build larger, more determined crowds.115
Therefore, the display function of ceremonial rhetoric is significant because of its visible,
ritualistic performance; “it strengthens the disposition toward action by increasing
adherence to the value it lauds.”116 As such, “the speaker’s reputation is not the exclusive
end of epideictic discourse,” but instead a consequence.117 Presidents promote policies to
build their ethos and increase the likelihood they win public approval or their candidacy.
When presidents perform political rituals, it effectively blurs the line between
theater and politics. That is, “the essence of campaigning and governing” consists of two
mutually reinforcing ideas; that campaign orations construct a moral vision of the future,
and that such visions are represented by broad political actions speakers wish to take to
get there.118 If presidents’ moral visions are shared by their audiences, they can achieve
what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca refer to as “amplification and enhancement.”119
This directly connects Aristotle, Condit, and Hauser’s arguments about epideictic
rhetoric. Ceremonial speaking uses value systems to teach public morality, manifesting a
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vision of ideal citizenship and encouraging the audience to support leaders who display
mastery of eloquent rhetoric and knowledge. In short, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
conclude that leaders “defend the traditional and accepted values” which influence
citizens “object of education” to readily convert “into universal values, if not eternal
truths, that which has acquired a certain standing through social unanimity.”120
Conclusion
Given the complexities of 21st century politics, U.S. presidents are bound to
encounter troubling events that require explanation to the public at large. What separates
21st century crises from earlier troubling times is the speed and open-ended access to
information that the public at large has. Generally, the immediate response to these
confusing situations is not deliberative because policy decisions have not been made by
the time information reaches the public. Before deliberative action can take place,
presidents must demonstrate control over the situation and explain what has happened to
U.S. citizens. Therefore, analyzing the rhetorical strategies presidents use requires a
detailed but concise understanding of the epideictic genre. Epideictic rhetoric, first and
foremost, praises or blames an object and invites audiences to make judgment on its
worthiness of honor or the reverse. This is true of all ceremonial discourse, and yet it is
woefully inadequate for the complex objects this thesis analyzes.
Contemporary studies of presidential epideictic rhetoric must pay close attention
to the exigencies calling ceremonial speakers forward. In the case of Obama’s Rose
Garden Address and the town hall debate, there are three important circumstances. First,
the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi spurred a crisis in U.S. public discourse.
Crises require strong leadership to define what has happened and promise the
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preservation of community heritage through the perseverance of widely-held beliefs that
pave the path forward to the future. Second, the death of a U.S. Ambassador opened
opportunity for Obama to articulate a moral vision of the nation, urging citizens to strive
for the exemplary character of hard-working diplomats that sacrifice their lives for the
sanctity of the country. Finally, the town hall debate illustrates how speakers use
deliberative means, arguing the expediency or inexpediency or various policies, to
enhance their own ethos and undermine the ethos of their opponent. Critics wishing to
understand the text as more than a list of platform items that may or may not ever amount
to legislation must appreciate it for its ceremonial qualities. Although the nationallytelevised debate served the needs of audience members, it primarily served the speakers
need of becoming elected as President of the United States. In short, critics should
approach presidential epideictic rhetoric by examining the ways it transforms the
instability of crises into manageable, well-defined events that inculcate and reaffirm a
particular heritage, guided by a fidelity to a moral vision that builds a cadre of exemplary
citizens acquiescing to the desires of the President of the United States.
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CHAPTER 4: EVALUATING THE ROSE GARDEN ADDRESS AND TOWN
HALL DEBATE AS PRESIDENTIAL EPIDEICTIC RHETORIC
The analytical framework developed in Chapter 3 provides significant insight into
Barack Obama’s remarks at the Rose Garden and the town hall debate as epideictic
events. In both cases, the President refrains from making explicit deliberative proposals
in the wake of the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi. Instead, Obama’s aim was to
nurture the public during a spectacular event that was troubling because of its
geographical and geopolitical distance from U.S. soil. To define that event in the Rose
Garden speech, Obama constructed the Benghazi attack as a crisis and eulogized
Christopher Stevens and the others who died. Later, he transformed an otherwise policyoriented presidential debate into an important epideictic moment. This chapter will
analyze the Rose Garden Address’s construction of a crisis and eulogy as well as the
significant ceremonial elements of the town hall debate to draw conclusions about their
implications for studies of presidential epideictic rhetoric.
Obama’s Rose Garden Address
In its most basic form, epideictic rhetoric praises or blames an object. Obama’s
Rose Garden Address simultaneously praises the life of Christopher Stevens and the
sacrifices of U.S. civil servants and blames the unknown, evil perpetrators for committing
intolerable acts of violence on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi. Celeste M. Condit’s three
epideictic functions, define/understand; shape/share a sense of community; and
display/entertain are clearly present in the speech. However, the Rose Garden Address is
unique because there are two distinct genres of epideictic rhetoric present.
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As Carolyn Miller argues, wholesale studies of epideictic texts are overly general
and miss important textual distinctions; instead, critics must identify the “constituent
strategies of contemporary genres” and their relationships to one another.1 This is not to
say that examining the eulogy of Christopher Stevens has no overlap with analyzing the
text as crisis rhetoric. Rather, it is precisely this overlap that warrants examining the text
as both a crisis speech and a eulogy in greater detail. Crisis rhetoric and eulogies have
situational, stylistic, and substantive similarities. However, they serve separate, yet
mutually-reinforcing functions. Therefore, this analysis organizes itself around the
particular types of ceremonial discourse evident in the Rose Garden Address but
maintains a fidelity to Condit’s functional pairs.
Communicating the Crisis in Benghazi
Traumatic or confusing events threaten our very sense of community, our
understanding of who we are as U.S. citizens and what we represent as a people. Rhetoric
that follows crisis situations are pre-dominantly either deliberative or epideictic. The
exigencies shaping the rhetorical situation help clarify how discourses should be
classified. When the rhetor announces some action previously unknown to the audience,
the discourse creates the crisis and is justificatory or deliberative. On the other hand,
when the audience is already aware of the event the discourse is a reaction and is
generally consummatory or epideictic.
In Obama’s case, the Rose Garden Address dealt with three pre-existing
exigencies, making it consummatory and thus epideictic. First, the attack in Benghazi
happened on September 11. More than a decade after the attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, September 11 is still, as Obama puts it, “a painful day for our
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nation” and a day that the nation mourns “with the families who were lost on that day.”2
Even had the attack in Benghazi not occurred, this would have still been a day of general
unease among citizens; a day on which people might be nervous to fly, to leave the
country or even to drive by an airport, a national monument, or a courthouse.
Because U.S. citizens already interpreted September 11 in such a specific way,
the other two emerging exigencies fit seamlessly into the situation. The second exigency
was the loss of U.S. citizens’ lives. Although the attack in Benghazi only resulted in the
deaths of only four individuals, they all held highly-esteemed positions. Obama needed to
offer an interpretation of that loss to the public because, as the President, he held the most
apropos position for explaining to the country what had occurred.
Finally, the lack of a coherent explanation by media outlets demanded that a highranking official offer clarity to the situation. It was initially unclear whether the attack
was spontaneous or premeditated, if any U.S. citizens had been killed or how many, and
whether this exposed a serious flaw in the security of the United States. Had the media
circulated a consistent story or waited for confirmation of what had happened, the public
may not have reacted in a way that required Obama to address the nation a mere twelve
hours after the attack. As Chapter 2 pointed out, it took little effort on the part of news
outlets to attach the September 11 label to the attack in Benghazi. The date of the attack,
the death of U.S. citizens, and the paranoia from uncertainty collectively called on
Obama.
Since Obama defined the attack in Benghazi through the lens of September 11, it
is worthwhile to analyze the Rose Garden Address as presidential crisis rhetoric and how
this genre of epideictic discourse influences the ways audiences are intended to
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understand messages. Recall from Chapter 3 that presidential crisis rhetoric emerges
when new facts are presented; a melodramatic comparison between pure and evil is
established; and troubling issues are shifted from practical to moral contexts. Each of
these characteristics is present in the Rose Garden Address. Obama was tasked with
presenting new, clarifying evidence; exhibiting fortitude and resolve toward the
perceived perpetrators; and framing the event as a moral issue instead of a political one
since the rhetorical situation was carefully suspended and wound up in the peak of an
extraordinarily heated election season. Bonnie J. Dow argues that when presidents
engage in crisis rhetoric, “the net effect of these strategies is to create a communal
meaning for the event which is consistent with the community’s existing beliefs and
values and which guides the response of its members” and strengthens their confidence
that the nation will endure in troubling times.3
Again, by the time Obama delivered the Rose Garden Address several media
outlets, including the Washington Post and New York Times had circulated information
and rumors about the attacks; some of which were confirmed by then Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton, but the majority was mere speculation. For example, Obama’s
announcement that on the previous night four “extraordinary Americans were killed in an
attack on our diplomatic post in Benghazi” was the first time it had been revealed that
more than two civil servants lives had been taken; and even at the time of the speech the
President noted that “we are still notifying the families of the others who were killed.”4
This not only confirmed the death of Libyan Ambassador Christopher Stevens and
Foreign Service Officer Sean Smith, but also revealed that at least two more lives were
lost in the assault.
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Revealing that U.S. diplomats had been killed was not the only new information
Obama offered citizens. One prominent and immediate critique of the Obama
Administration was that it had not effectively anticipated or reacted to the attack on the
U.S. Consulate in Benghazi.5 Obama responded to these criticisms by arguing that
because of “this outrageous and shocking attack,” the U.S. was actively “working with
the government of Libya to secure our diplomats” and he had directed his “administration
to increase our security at diplomatic posts around the world.”6 Further, the President
argued that this cooperation with Libya was not a new policy, even if news of its
existence had been scant prior. This information was a necessary, consummatory reaction
to the rumors that the U.S. had been unprepared for the attack, that it would destroy the
nation’s hard work of stabilizing a Libya in political turmoil. Contrary to such
speculation, Obama noted, “already, many Libyans have joined us . . . and this attack will
not break the bonds between the United States and Libya.”7 Still, recognizing the tragic
deaths of U.S. diplomats and reaffirming the nation’s commitment to building a future
Libya is on its own insufficient to consider the text crisis rhetoric. While the President
certainly asserted possession of new facts about the situation, it has not been uncommon
for the U.S. to cooperate with Middle Eastern or North African countries regarding
terrorist activity, nor has the deaths of U.S. citizens throughout the broader War on
Terror. The President’s presentation of information does, however, achieve the epideictic
function of define/understand because it clarified an unusually troubling situation and
fostered a clear understanding that the tragedy was being adequately dealt with.
In order to strengthen his own position and the broader position of the U.S. in the
Benghazi crisis, Obama needed to demonstrate that the U.S. had only the purest motives
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in Libya and that the perpetrators of the attack were ruthless, stopping at nothing to
ensure its failure and destruction. To build the case that the U.S. was innocent, Obama
was tasked with representing the diplomats, himself, and the nation at large. In other
words, the President needed to shape a nation-wide sense of community in order to share
it among all citizens who had heard about the attack in Benghazi. American diplomats,
Obama said, “work tirelessly to advance the interests and values of our nation,” often
forcing them to “brave great danger.”8 Prior to the attack, the President claimed he was
engaged in similar work. Obama, earlier in the day, was busy visiting “the graves of
troops who made the ultimate sacrifice in Iraq and Afghanistan at the hallowed grounds
of Arlington Cemetery,” where he “had the opportunity to say thank you” for their
services before nightfall when he “learned the news of this attack in Benghazi.”9 Finally,
Obama expressed that “since our founding, the United States has been a nation that
respects all faiths,” rejecting “all efforts to denigrate the religious beliefs of others,”
urging the world to “stand together to unequivocally reject these brutal acts.”10 Together,
these statements conveyed that the United States in no way instigated the attacks in
Benghazi because everything the nation represented could be framed around the pursuit
of justice to bring about global freedom.
Conversely, the President needed to portray the perpetrators as evil-doers,
separating the U.S. as far from them as possible. Condit argues that communities are
sometimes identifiable by who is outside of them as well as whom its constitutive
members are. In this regard, the President shared the nation’s sense of community by
contrasting it from the villains responsible for the death of U.S. civil servants in
Benghazi; characterizing the U.S. as “good,” ranging the country against the “bad.”
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Obama began this process by arguing that “there is absolutely no justification to this type
of senseless violence.”11 Any individuals willing to commit that type of spectacular
violence must be outright rejected, and justice must be served. The President promised
that “we will not waver in our commitment to see that justice is done for this terrible act,”
and after a pause repeated “…make no mistake, justice will be done.”12 Even more
explicitly, Obama, referring to Stevens and the other diplomats, said that “the lives these
Americans led stand in stark contrast to those of their attackers.”13 In other words, Obama
unambiguously delineated the unknown attackers from the slain U.S. diplomats by
contrasting the evil-doers with individuals “who represent the very best of the United
States of America.”14 Most importantly, the President affirmed that he would “bring to
justice the killers who attacked our people,” cementing their identity as sworn enemies of
the institutions foundational to people of the United States.
The final element of crisis discourse is shifting the troubling event from a
practical to a moral context. This technique consists of praising communally-accepted
ethics that reinforce the community’s purpose. Such a shift is emblematic of Condit’s
display/entertain function of epideictic rhetoric because it demonstrates speakers’
leadership over a situation through their artful, persuasive language to enhance their
audiences’ experiences. Obama’s rhetoric highlights the intersection between Condit’s
functional pairs. Not only does the Rose Garden Address shift a practical issue to a moral
context; in doing so, it instructs citizens on what they must become in light of acts of
terror. Factually, the Rose Garden Address does not articulate a deliberative course of
action in response to the attack, nor does it even hint at one beyond the promise for
justice to be served. Instead, there is an immense focus on the moral resolve of the United
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States in the face of dangerous rapscallions. For example, Obama told citizens that “as
Americans, let us never, ever forget that our freedom is only sustained because there are
people who are willing to fight for it, to stand up for it, and in some cases, lay down their
lives for it.”15 Urging citizens’ perseverance during the tragic moment, the President
contended that “our country is only as strong as the character of our people and the
service of those . . . who represent us around the globe.”16 If the U.S. is to remain the
global protector of freedom, citizens must not let acts of terror “ever shake the resolve of
this great nation, alter that character, or eclipse the light of the values that we stand for.”17
Obama argues that because of the hard work and sacrifice of U.S. diplomats, every
citizen should take “great pride in the country” and recognize “that our flag represents to
people around the globe who also yearn to live in freedom and with dignity” the hope for
a better future.18
Given the complexities of the situation, it is difficult to assess whether the attack
in Benghazi produced a genuine crisis. That is, the ambiguity of what actually occurred
on September 11, 2012 made it problematic even for U.S. intelligence agencies to
determine whether the attack highlighted a broader security threat to the nation and its
people. However, hashing this question out misses the more important implication of
presidential crisis rhetoric in this case study. Instead, it is more significant to ask if the
events transpiring at the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi did not constitute a legitimate crisis
to the nation because the President elevated the attack to a level of parity with the “acts of
terror” that threaten to “shake the resolve of this great nation.”19 Either way, the Benghazi
attack was still what Condit calls a “troubling event” and certainly brought back
memories of genuine crises like the 2001 attacks on New York and the Pentagon for U.S.
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citizens. Because what “was already a painful day for our nation” became worse when
“the solemn memory of the 9/11 attacks” and all of its constitutive weight was revived by
the Benghazi attack, Obama easily compared it to those on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon eleven years earlier. Summarily, Obama used the constitutive weight of
September 11 to frame the attack in Benghazi as a crisis that threatened U.S. citizens’
way of life, the freedoms guaranteed to them, and the pursuit of justice only possible if
the nation maintained firm resolve, therefore encouraging its people to remain committed
to the moral vision of a “stronger America and a better world for all of our children.”20
When national crises occur, the public becomes angry, afraid, and sometimes
confused. The ensuing paranoia requires a leader to emerge to address them. Obama’s
Rose Garden Address recognized that the attack in Benghazi exposed the nation’s
vulnerability, and from that recognition the President reminded U.S. citizens who they
were as a people. They were the people represented by Christopher Stevens and other
brave diplomats who devoted their lives to sustaining freedom and justice around the
world. As long as “their legacy will live on through . . . the hearts of those who love
them,” the U.S. will move forward and become a stronger, more unified people.21
Elegiac Eulogy for Stevens
The President’s words were certainly encouraging, but the proclamation that
justice would be served could not alone convince citizens that the crisis could be
resolved. It is for this reason that Obama’s fusion of two important epideictic genres into
one ceremonial occasion occurred seamlessly. Chapter 3 noted that eulogies are
themselves a particular form of crisis rhetoric because the most basic need they satisfy is
assigning meaning to community loss and proceeding forward from it. Approaching the
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eulogy from this basic premise, however, is insufficient to capture the rhetorical
strategies at play in the Rose Garden Address.
There are sharp differences between a eulogy delivered by family members of a
lost loved one to a small funeral gathering and a televised eulogy for individuals that
many listeners may have never heard of prior. One particularly important difference is
that achieving audience identification becomes more difficult because speakers must
describe the deceased persons in ways that complete strangers can relate. Eulogies
delivered by the President to the nation thus possess distinct characteristics. Regarding
these characteristics, Amos Kiewe notes that “presidents, in particular, are prone to the
practice of conditioning memories” that citizens retain after they witness eulogies of
persons that presidents recognize as special individuals.22
Therefore, it is important to isolate and discuss four functions of presidential
eulogy that assist in accomplishing this task. The first three functions, dissociating the
nation from responsibility; establishing a value-laden context; and urging perseverance in
present policy are borrowed from Dow. Not all eulogies are delivered in the context of a
crisis, but given the rhetorical situation, it is important to understand how the President’s
eulogy contributed to the impending crisis. Informing good citizenship, the fourth
function, is borrowed from Gerard Hauser.23 Because of Obama’s stature, the eulogy was
not meant simply to mourn the loss of Stevens, but also to inspire U.S. citizens to emulate
his civic virtues. This is the teaching function of epideictic that Hauser describes. In
relation to the rhetorical situation Obama was faced with, it is important to understand
how funeral orations exhibit the potential to transcend crises. Put another way,
presidential deliver eulogies in a variety of contexts; however, in this particular situation
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it functions both to remember the loss of loved ones and to explain what the community
represents, and its understanding of who it is made up of in the wake of crisis situations.
One of the core controversies surrounding the attack in Benghazi was whether or
not the U.S. could have prevented it. It remains unclear whether intelligence agencies
believed the attack was spontaneous or premeditated. Although the Rose Garden Address
does not address the issue directly, Obama ensured citizens that in the aftermath of the
attack “we’re working . . . to secure our diplomats” and to “increase security at
diplomatic posts around the world.”24 Further, U.S. civil servants could not have been
responsible for the violence in Benghazi because they “stood up for freedom and human
dignity,” striving to bring peace to those “who also yearn to live in freedom and with
dignity.”25 On the contrary, Stevens and the other diplomats were unconditionally
dedicated to assisting Libyans “striving to emerge from the recent experience of war” in a
country battered and war-torn by the Qaddafi regime.26 To admit that the U.S. had not
been prepared for the attack or that the diplomats engaged in provocative activities would
be a concession of complicity. The eulogy needed to reflect that the nation had not simply
let the attack slip through the cracks and that the slain diplomats never saw their death
coming.
Eulogies offer excellent opportunities for leaders to inject value-laden claims into
what might appear as pre-dominantly political issues, providing them an additional means
of reacting to crisis situations. When celebrating the lives of fallen citizens, eulogies tend
to focus less on the lived experiences of individuals and more on the qualities of those
people that resulted in their significant contributions and achievements. This is not to say
funeral orations completely ignore or sideline lived experiences; rather, they play a more
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supportive role by enhancing the credibility of the claims speakers make about their
subject’s character. By illuminating and prioritizing the eulogized persons’ remarkable
qualities, speakers commemorate the values that define individuals’ experiences.
Commenting on the “use of epideictic to revise collective memory and to transform the
image of a model American,” Cindy Koenig Richards contends that commemoration
evokes “a powerful communal identification” because it celebrates “an icon” of
“traditional values” through “a complex rhetorical performance” that reconstitutes “the
membership of a public community.”27 The eulogy itself reinforces communal bonds
between an otherwise widely diverse series of populations.
President Obama recognized that Stevens “built partnerships with Libyan
revolutionaries, and helped them as they planned to build a new Libya;” but this was only
possible because of Stevens’ “characteristic skill, courage, and resolve” that set him apart
from other U.S. civil servants.28 Stevens’ death in Benghazi was particularly tragic
“because it is a city that he helped to save;” but more importantly, “he worked tirelessly
to support this young democracy” because he was an exemplary diplomat.29 Certainly
Stevens’ lived experiences in Libya reflect his dedication as a U.S. Ambassador, but
those experiences may be inaccessible to the community at large. Therefore, Obama
carefully attached Stevens’ actions to character qualities, courage and resolve, that U.S.
citizens should strive to have themselves. In other words, the President focused his efforts
on describing the type of values “these extraordinary Americans” possessed that allowed
them to put their lives on the line for the cause of the nation.30
Obama’s Rose Garden Address does not offer a policy prescription in response to
the attack in Benghazi, but the text did urge citizens to persevere and support the nation’s
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existing goals. In wake of the attack, Obama told the country that “today, the American
people stand united,” arguing that such fortitude was necessary to move forward in
troubling times. Further, the President did not argue that the U.S. needed to change
course. On the contrary, Obama said we must “continue their work” that brought hope
and democracy to Libyan revolutionaries for people around the globe.31 If those goals
were to be achieved, Obama argued, the U.S. and its people must “not waver in our
commitment to see that justice done for this terrible act” and others which will inevitably
threaten the nation-wide community. Despite the bloodshed and instability in Libya,
Obama reminded citizens that “many Libyans have joined us” in alleviating the North
African country’s woes and those Libyans would fight back “against the attackers
alongside Americans.”32 All in all, Obama did not present a policy to put into place in
response to the attack in Benghazi. Doing so may have been a tragic mistake since the
attack had occurred only hours prior and a misstep could have resulted in political
suicide. Instead, the President reassured citizens that the loss of an important U.S. life
was not in vain; Stevens’ contributions made an unstable part of the world a better place
and continuing that branch of work would prove crucial to maintaining that stability in
the future.
Despite the lack of a policy proposal, there were political implications for
Obama’s Rose Garden Address. Kiewe argues that “eulogies have been used throughout
history as political tools . . . the encomium has political objectives embedded in the
intersection between character and ideology.”33 If the eulogist convinces listeners that
they ought to emulate the actions of their lost loved ones or the nation’s most heroic
figures, then they have inspired more than just judgment on the honor or dishonor of
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those persons; the eulogist has encouraged the community to act a certain way and frame
their politics in similar fashion. This valorization, Kiewe contends, is how “the user of
epideictic . . . can advance political objectives without necessarily resorting to overt
partisan advocacy. Persuasion, in this sense, can succeed when generated by an appealing
narrative as distinct of an overt advocacy.”34 Therefore, even when it appears the
President is urging citizens to continue their support for the policies present in the status
quo, it is erroneous to write off the presence of a political agenda. After all, epideictic
rhetoric satisfies both the needs of audiences and the corresponding speakers.
The focus of Obama’s eulogy for Stevens reflected on his qualities as a civil
servant of the U.S. and not his lived experiences because those were less relatable to
citizens tuned into the Rose Garden Address. These characteristics; skill; courage; and
resolve represent qualities of ideal citizens. Speaking on the power of embodying U.S.
civic virtues, Richards argues that by associating characters “with traditional US symbols
and heroes,” displaying them “as a model of civic values such as courage, duty, and
progress,” epideictic rhetoric offers a performance that is “aesthetically appealing and
culturally resonant” because it evokes an identity that draws its norms from the nation’s
heritage.35 Hauser argues that the noble qualities presented in epideictic address should
benefit the community, where acts of courage and the pursuit of justice are the most
powerful because they embody virtues that resonate through the entire community.36
Obama praised Stevens in such a way that listeners were being taught the necessary
components of good citizenship. Eulogies have immense capacity to illuminate this
reflection because they celebrate the lives of extraordinary individuals whom listeners
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ought to strive to become. If successful, eulogies can inculcate a language of excellence
that listeners seek to assimilate themselves into.
Stevens’ eulogy was no exception. Speaking of Stevens’ civic engagement,
Obama argued that “he was a role model to all who worked with him and to the young
diplomats who aspire to walk in his footsteps.”37 It was not only young diplomats who
looked up to Stevens; Obama was quick to point out that both he and then Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton “relied deeply on his knowledge of the situation on the ground” in
Benghazi and trusted his leadership skills as the U.S. Ambassador to Libya.38 Stevens and
the other diplomats thus became concrete representations of what citizens ought to be,
and the nation-wide community was invited to share in their optimism for a better world.
Eulogies are, without doubt, the way many listeners will remember their deceased
loved ones or heroes. The powerful words spoken by Obama celebrating Stevens’ and the
other diplomats’ lives cemented the legacy of courageous civil servants fighting for a
freer world. Obama admitted that “the loss of these four Americans is fresh,” but ensured
listeners that “our memories of them linger on.”39 Not only would these memories
survive through the President and the loved ones remembering them, Obama also had “no
doubt that their legacy will live on through the work that they did far from our shores.”40
Explicitly, the President engaged in collective remembering for the departed diplomats
when he claimed that “we grieve with their families” and we will “carry on their
memory,” continuing their tireless efforts to advance a more peaceful world for all of its
children.41 Summarily, Obama’s eulogy of Stevens and the other diplomats killed in the
Benghazi attack dissociated the nation from complicity in the crisis; assigned the values
of courage and resolve to the struggle in Libya; and urged citizens to carry on the
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memory of the civil servants by striving to emulate their exemplary characteristics as
ideal public figures.
A Tumultuous Time at Town Hall
On October 16, 2012, incumbent President Obama and Republican Governor
Romney met at Hofstra University in New York for the second presidential debate. This
debate was particularly important to Obama because of the widespread perception that
Romney “won” the first contest. Even CNN, a news outlet generally geared toward liberal
viewers, produced a poll after the debate showing that 67% of respondents believed
Romney was victorious and only 25% thought Obama performed better.42 According to
George Lakoff of the Huffington Post, “You don’t win a presidential debate by being a
policy wonk. Obama violated all the basics of presidential debating.”43 A few of these
“basics” are remarkably similar to the characteristics and functions of epideictic rhetoric.
What Obama lacked, Lakoff argues, was a clear statement of his moral values that
contrasted Romney’s; a projection of empathy and enthusiasm that connected with
listeners, and an authentic view of himself that the public could identify with and be
proud of.44 Instead of doing this, Obama just “talked about policy details.”45 As Robert
Rowland argues, commenting on the first presidential debate between Obama and
Romney, “Carefully explaining positions or providing nuanced explanations not only did
not help Obama but it hurt him” because viewers have developed a disdain for even
modestly complicated arguments that are “brain bruising television.”46
Lakoff’s criticism, at first glance, seems misplaced because the debates were
about policy issues. For the second debate, the Gallup Organization sifted through a
group of undecided voters and invited 82 of them to attend the small, intimate town hall
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setting that Obama and Romney competed in. Candy Crowley from CNN moderated
audience questions and the candidates’ responses. Each question was supposed to deal
with domestic policy issues, similar to the first debate. This is because the third and final
debate was reserved exclusively for international issues. According to CNN
correspondent Tom Cohen’s analysis of the debate, the issues discussed in the town hall
event included: taxes; unemployment; jobs; the national debt; energy production and
independence; women’s rights; health care, and immigration.47 One foreign policy issue,
however, did manage to slip into the debate; the attack on the U.S. Consulate in
Benghazi, Libya. Not only did Crowley allow the question, it became one of the most
intense, escalatory moments of the night.
That the Benghazi question was strictly a foreign policy matter was not the only
thing separating it from the rest of the questions asked throughout the debate. Instead of
focusing on what each candidate would do to improve diplomat security or the situation
in Libya, both Obama and Romney were fixated on a prior speech, the Rose Garden
Address. Even if every other question in the debate fostered discussion of the expediency
or inexpediency of each nominee’s agenda, the Benghazi portion of the event had no
evidence of some future expediency or inexpediency; no suggested policy, and no
desirable outcome for listeners to hang their hats on. This was true of both Obama and
Romney’s responses to the question. Instead, the tragedy that killed four U.S. diplomats a
month earlier was used by both candidates to attack the credibility of one another’s
leadership on national security and terrorism. In other words, Obama and Romney bashed
one another’s suitability as the potential commander in chief.
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The town hall debate was intended to clarify Obama’s and Romney’s domestic
platforms as presidential candidates. Why then did both contenders abandon their
agendas in favor of jabs at one another’s credibility on the Benghazi issue? As Chapter 3
argued earlier, each candidate’s ultimate goal in the debate was to persuade voters that he
was the ideal national leader and possessed the best skills to make expedient decisions for
the country. Listeners were tasked with deciding who did the better debating not only
because of how well the candidates’ agendas lined up with their own, but also because
either Obama or Romney exhibited the ethos necessary to occupy the Oval Office.
Audience members were voting for which person won the debate, not which policies they
supported.
Certainly voters have personal politics and the platforms of the candidates
influenced how those citizens initially perceived them. Still, voters are not legislators
deciding which agenda items will become law; rather, they are deciding which individual
will be elected to enact those policies in the future. Surely Obama and Romney argued
about the expediency of their own agendas and the inexpediency of their opponent’s, but
this demonstrated that each candidate wielded political rhetoric as a means to achieving
ceremonial ends—enhancing his own ethos as a national leader in the eyes of citizens. As
Dow concludes, “all discourses that discuss policy are not necessarily deliberative.”48 In
short, the town hall debate on Benghazi was a pre-dominantly epideictic event; the
candidates used the failures of their opponent’s deliberative policies as a means to
achieve an epideictic ends of enhancing their ethos, leaving listeners to make judgment
on the honorability of the contenders as worthy or unworthy of becoming President of the
United States.
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When Kerry Ladka asked Obama about “reports that the State Department refused
extra security for our embassy in Benghazi, Libya, prior to the attacks that killed four
Americans,” the debate shifted dramatically.49 What followed was a heated argument
between Obama and Romney, immediately personalized by the issues of the President’s
responsibility for the attack and his response at the Rose Garden. In this regard, I argue
that the Benghazi question ought to be treated as an epideictic moment of the debate,
even if deliberative elements are identifiable throughout the dialogue. The shift from the
candidates’ number-crunching on tax policy to Romney challenging Obama’s worthiness
of the presidency in light of the attack in Benghazi exemplifies the discussion of Paul I.
Rosenthal’s personal and non-personal persuasion in Chapter 3. Instead of arguing that
Obama’s policy lacked clarity or cohesiveness, Romney directly attacked Obama’s ethos;
using Benghazi as a vehicle for the message that the President was responsible for the
eroding primacy and credibility of the United States. This, Michael Leff and Gerald P.
Mohrmann conclude, is precisely the type of situation where the audience may be under
the impression that the purpose of the debate is to gain adherence to specific policies, but
the treatment of those individual agenda items is subsidiary to achieving identification
between speakers and listeners.
Since Ladka’s question was for Obama, he had the first opportunity to address the
issue. Obama did not begin his answer with an explanation of the security procedures for
the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi. Instead, Obama said:
Well, let me first of all talk about our diplomats, because they serve all around the
world and do an incredible job in a very dangerous situation. And these aren’t just
representatives of the United States, they are my representatives. I send them
there, oftentimes into harm’s way. I know these folks and I know their families.
So nobody is more concerned about their safety and security than I am [emphasis
added].50
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The president strategically chose to begin the answer this way because it established two
important details. First, Obama illustrated once again that U.S. diplomats were
extraordinary individuals who risked their lives for the safety and security of the nation
and that they braved danger all over the world on a daily basis. Second, and more
significantly, Obama let listeners know that he had a personal connection not only to the
departed diplomats, but also their families. This signaled that the President cared deeply
and compassionately for those who lost loved ones and that he had the upmost concern
for resolving the crisis caused by the attack in Benghazi. Obama made sure to mention
that a few days after the attack, he “was there greeting the caskets coming into Andrews
Air Force Base and grieving with the families.”51
While Obama had kindhearted words for the slain civil servants and their
families, the same could not be said about how the President characterized Romney’s
response to the attack. “While we were still dealing with our diplomats being threatened,”
Obama noted, “Romney put out a press release trying to make political points, and that’s
not how a commander in chief operates. You don’t turn national security into a political
issue. Certainly not when it’s happening [emphasis added].”52 The President made a
crystal clear argument that Romney did not deserve to be commander in chief because the
Republican nominee was more concerned with his own political gain than the untimely
death of outstanding U.S. diplomats. In other words, Obama was attempting to portray to
viewers that he held close relationships with important citizens, who held him in high
esteem; but, Romney ignored them and therefore had no connection with the individuals
who Obama had mourned for at the Rose Garden.
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Romney sought to fire Obama’s criticism right back at him. On the day following
the attack, Romney claimed, Obama flew “to Las Vegas for a political fund-raiser, then
the next day to Colorado for another . . . political event. I think these – these actions
taken by a president and a leader have symbolic significance and perhaps even material
significance.”53 The strategy behind Romney’s accusation was to highlight that Obama
was not being completely truthful about his political motives; that Obama too sought to
gain credibility from the attack, and that he continued his election campaign as if nothing
had occurred. Although Romney had little to say about Obama’s established relationship
with the families of the departed diplomats, he did mention that he felt “very deeply
sympathetic for the families of those who lost loved ones.”54 In short, with regards to the
diplomats and their families, both candidates expressed sympathy over what had
happened; each candidate accused the other of prioritizing politics over the people; but,
while Romney only forwarded a criticism blaming Obama, the President praised himself
for the time and effort he had put forward getting to know the families and illustrating
concern for their wellbeing in addition to pointing out the dishonor of Romney’s actions.
Crowley offered Obama an opportunity to deflect the blame for the attack onto
Hillary Clinton when she asked, “your secretary of state, as I’m sure you know, has said
that she takes full responsibility for the attack on the diplomatic mission in Benghazi.
Does the buck stop with your secretary of state as far as what went on here?”55 Obama
opted not to do so; instead he noted that “Clinton has done an extraordinary job. But she
works for me. I’m the president and I’m always responsible, and that’s why nobody’s
more interested in finding out exactly what happened than I do [emphasis added].”56 This
also provided the President with an opportunity to deal a heavy blow to Romney’s
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credibility on the question of pursuing self-gain over caring about the slain civil servants
and their families. Obama added, “and the suggestion that anybody in my team, whether
the Secretary of State, our U.N. Ambassador, anybody on my team would play politics or
mislead when we’ve lost four of our own, governor, is offensive. That’s not what we do.
That’s not what I do as president, that’s not what I do as Commander in Chief.”57
After Obama spoke about the civil servants and their families, the President
attempted to make a more concerted effort to respond to Ladka’s question:
. . . as soon as we found out that the Benghazi consulate was being overrun, I was
on the phone with my national security team and I gave them three instructions.
Number one, beef up our security and procedures, not just in Libya, but at every
embassy and consulate in the region. Number two, investigate exactly what
happened, regardless of where the facts lead us, to make sure folks are held
accountable and it doesn’t happen again. And number three, we are going to find
out who did this and we’re going to hunt them down, because one of the things
that I’ve said throughout my presidency is when folks mess with Americans, we
go after them.58
Each of Obama’s three instructions illustrates the ways that leaders use questions of
expediency to enhance their ethos. First, the President immediately ordered enhanced
security at all locations that could have become vulnerable in wake of the attack. While
substantively this did not address Ladka’s concern with security measures before the
attack, it does demonstrate Obama’s expedient reaction and his intelligence as a leader
because he called for bolstered security at other potential targets as well. Second,
Obama’s demand for an answer about what had occurred regardless of whether the result
would hurt his image showed that he was putting citizens’ lives above his political
posture. Not only did he call for the truth, the President commanded that the perpetrators
be identified and that the military ensured no further attacks would occur.
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Finally, Obama reminded viewers that he was serious about eliminating threats to
the nation when he announced that if the attackers were identified they would be hunted
down. To support this claim, Obama argued that “when it comes to our national security,
I mean what I say.”59 Obama cited some empirical examples:
. . . not everybody agrees with some of the decisions I’ve made. But . . . I said I’d
end the war in Libya – in – in Iraq, and I did. I said that we’d go after al-Qaeda
and bin Laden, we have. I said we’d transition out of Afghanistan, and start
making sure that Afghans are responsible for their own security, that’s what I’m
doing. And when it comes to this issue, when I say that we are going to find out
exactly what happened, everybody will be held accountable. And I am ultimately
responsible for what’s taking place there because these are my folks, and I’m the
one who has to greet those coffins when they come home. You know that I mean
what I say.60
Again, these are all examples of Obama tying his national security policies to himself; the
President refers to himself twelve times in this relatively short passage. This is about
Obama, not his policies, and therefore why this is an epideictic moment, not a
deliberative one. The President is not using these examples as independent reasons
listeners ought to vote for him. Instead, these are proclamations of leadership that provide
him with pragmatic evidence that he is well-equipped to handle some of the greatest
challenges U.S. presidents have ever faced.
Romney did not address each of Obama’s examples, but he did offer a criticism of
the way the President had handled national security issues abroad. This criticism began
with the Massachusetts Governor quoting the President, identifying that he “said
correctly that the buck does stop at his desk and – and he takes responsibility for – for
that – for the failure in providing those security resources” that could have prevented the
deaths of U.S. citizens.61 Not only did Obama fail in Benghazi, Romney argued, but “the
president’s policies throughout the Middle East began with an apology tour and . . . this
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strategy is unraveling before our very eyes,” evidenced by the ease with which the attack
in Benghazi occurred.62 Given what had happened in Benghazi, the Republican contender
argued:
. . . this calls into question the president’s whole policy in the Middle East. Look
what’s happening in Syria, in Egypt, now in Libya. Consider the distance between
ourselves and – and Israel, the president said that – that he was going to put
daylight between us and Israel. We have Iran four years closer to a nuclear bomb.
Syria – Syria’s not just a tragedy of 30,000 civilians being killed by a military, but
also a strategic – strategically significant player for America.63
There is a clear critique of the President’s ability to resolve a number of important
international issues; but again, Romney’s purpose in identifying the weaknesses of
Obama’s foreign policy is to tarnish his credibility as an individual deserving to be
elected, not to urge a change of course. Governor Romney never offered an alternative to
any of the problems he identified.
Both candidates had plenty of ammunition to fire at their opponent with the goal
of reducing his opponent’s ethos as a leader. Neither Obama nor Romney made much
attempt to address the particular criticisms being forwarded from either side. However,
one major slip on Romney’s behalf unraveled any credibility he may have built with
listeners. The Republican nominee argued that the attack itself was only part of the
problem emerging from Benghazi:
There were other issues associated with this – with this tragedy. There were many
days that passed before we knew whether this was a spontaneous demonstration
or actually whether it was a terrorist attack. And there was no demonstration
involved. It was a terrorist attack and it took a long time for that to be told to the
American people. Whether there was some misleading, or instead whether we just
didn’t know what happened, you have to ask yourself why didn’t we know five
days later when the ambassador to the United Nations went on TV to say that this
was a demonstration. How could we have not known?64
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Romney was clearly referring to the massive uncertainty seen in the media immediately
following the first signs that the attack had occurred. Indeed, as Chapter 2 discussed in
detail, there were multiple competing stories of what had transpired on the night of
September 11, 2012. However, the governor did not select his words in this hard press
very carefully, and it came at a cost.
Obama retorted by reminding Romney and listeners that “the day after the attack,
governor, I stood in the Rose Garden and I told the American people in the world that we
are going to find out exactly what happened. That this was an act of terror and I also said
that we’re going to hunt down those who committed this crime.”65 Romney, under the
impression he had just gotten the golden opportunity to fact-check Obama and embarrass
him on national television, paused and said he thought it was interesting that “the
president just said something which – which is that on the day after the attack he went
into the Rose Garden and said that this was an act of terror.”66 The dialogue that followed
did not proceed as Romney anticipated it would:
Obama: That’s what I said.
Romney: You said in the Rose Garden the day after the attack, it was an act of
terror. It was not a spontaneous demonstration, is that what you’re saying?
Obama: Please proceed governor.
Romney: I want to make sure we get that for the record because it took the
president 14 days before he called the attack in Benghazi an act of terror.
Obama: Get the transcript.
Crowley: It – it – it – he did in fact, sir. So let me – let me call it an act of terror.
Obama: Can you say that a little louder, Candy? 67
Worded differently, Romney’s initial accusation could have completely devastated
Obama’s ethos on the Benghazi question. The initial argument the Republican nominee
was attempting to make was that there were severe discrepancies within the Obama
Administration about what had transpired. Romney noted that the U.N. Ambassador, five
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days after Stevens’ death, reported on television that the attack in Benghazi occurred
spontaneously because of a demonstration in response to a film critical of Muslims.68 Had
Romney conceded that Obama called it an act of terror, this would have provided him
with more than ample opportunity to criticize the inconsistencies of the Obama
Administration on the Benghazi issue.
Unfortunately for Romney, he chose to focus on whether or not Obama called the
attack an act of terror. When Crowley cited the transcript, demonstrating that Obama had
in fact labeled it an act of terror, Romney’s strategy completely backfired. Any ethos
Romney had built up at this point was instantly shattered; and conversely, any trouble
Obama may have been in had been taken care of thanks in part to Governor Romney.
Crowley, attempting to act as a fair moderator, pointed out that while Obama “did call it
an act of terror. It did as well take – it did as well take two weeks or so for the whole idea
there being a riot out there about his tape to come out. You are correct about that.”69
Despite this, Romney once again uttered that “this – the administration – the
administration indicated this was a reaction to a video and was a spontaneous reaction . . .
it took them a long time to say this was a terrorist act by a terrorist group. And to suggest
– am I incorrect in that regard, on Sunday the – your secretary . . . ;” but, before he could
finish Obama cut him off by simply saying “Candy?”70
Realizing he had put himself in an extremely poor position, Romney tried to
backpedal by interjecting “Excuse me. The ambassador of the United Nations went on the
Sunday television shows and spoke about how…” but he could not finish his statement
before a rapid back and forth began between himself and Obama, all the while Crowley
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was attempting to move to the next question.71 Neither candidate successfully uttered
another complete sentence before Crowley ended the discussion on Benghazi.
Had Romney buckled down on the discrepancies between Obama and the U.N.
Ambassador, the issue could have turned another way. Romney could have exposed a
major inconsistency with the potential to harm the President’s credibility in front of a
nation-wide audience. However, Obama was able to dodge the controversy and this made
him look much more credible on the issue than he may have even been prior to the
debate. As Chapter 3 discussed, it is impossible to determine the winner or loser of a
presidential debate by the probability that the audience adopts their policy platforms.
Instead, critics must examine these texts as pieces of a larger, ongoing process that
speakers engage in to build achieve the maximum level of audience adherence. Obama
invested a substantial amount of time reciting examples of his leadership throughout his
presidency; and in conjunction, easily exploited a major mishap on the part of Romney.
Romney, given his massive blunder on the issue, could not capture the visible, ritualistic
function of ceremonial rhetoric. As such, Obama capitalized on Romney’s mistakes
guaranteeing that, at least on the Benghazi question, he was the sole possessor of an ethos
necessary to lead the nation forward that could be trusted by citizens.
At no point during the Benghazi debate did either candidate hint at how they
would handle similar situations in the future. When Romney issued a personal attack on
Obama about what he had said in the Rose Garden, the debate slid away from the policy
and focused almost exclusively on each candidate’s credibility. This portion of the town
hall debate illustrates that campaign orations rely on arguments about the expediency or
inexpediency of policies to enhance their ethos. Had the debaters been tasked with
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solving the problem, they would have performed differently; Obama and Romney would
have articulated reasons that their credibility as leaders was sufficient evidence to prefer
their respective policies. Instead, Obama referred to his previous endeavors to
demonstrate that he was the superior candidate for President of the United States and
Romney attempted to challenge those depictions.
This chapter examines the town hall debate on Benghazi as an epideictic moment.
Such an interpretation is at odds with some conventional wisdom that suggests
presidential debates are pre-dominantly deliberative, not epideictic. My analysis is not
intended to detract from these texts being examined in such a fashion. However,
particularly in the context of the Benghazi question in the debate examined here, the
speech responds to the immediate rhetorical problem of a political campaign that
determines who becomes the next President of the United States, not what policies should
or should not be supported. In other words, there are certainly important reasons for
studying policy arguments and how they affect groups such as single-issue voters. But, as
Condit notes, “if we were to be so bold as to proclaim presidential debates to be
epideictic speeches, we would recognize their importance, not as policy arguments, or
even as opportunities for aligning interests, but rather as one of our best chances to judge
the eloquence—the broad humane capacities—of a would-be leader.”72
Conclusion
The functions of contemporary presidential epideictic rhetoric are made readily
apparent by examining Obama’s persuasive strategies at the Rose Garden and in the town
hall debate. Although it is unlikely the President has taken a crash course in ceremonial
rhetoric, there is strong evidence that Obama defined the attack in Benghazi in a fashion
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that would reach the largest possible audience, composed of U.S. citizens whose moral
compass reflected the heritage of the United States. By displaying robust leadership in a
troubling time and artfully commemorating the loss of Christopher Stevens, Obama
stretched the daily experiences of listeners by encouraging them to acquiesce to the types
of behaviors, actions, and beliefs that made Stevens and the other departed diplomats
ideal U.S. citizens.
This analysis does not make any claims about the effectiveness of the Rose
Garden Address or town hall debate. There is too much potential for alternative causality
to make that sort of judgment. Instead, examining these texts highlights an important
pattern in presidential ceremonial discourse; leaders will reach into the past and draw
from it powerful moments to explain confusing events in the present. These explanations
serve not only a clarifying effect for citizens, they also frame issues in particular ways
that allow leaders to tell citizens who they are, what they represent, and how that heritage
will continue in the face of threats. The capacity for leaders to have such sway over their
people is significant not because they can urge better policies; but rather, because they
possess the authority to tell an entire population who they are. In short, eloquent
ceremonial rhetoric provides authoritative figures with the power of the teacher; an
individual who decides what is virtuous and what is evil. Given this incredible
responsibility, critics must continue to pay close attention to the ways U.S. presidents
characterize the state of society to understand who citizens are, what their purpose is, and
why they have come to accept that identity and determination.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS ON CONTEMPORARY
PRESIDENTIAL EPIDEICTIC RHETORIC
The goal of this thesis project was to investigate the rhetorical implications of
Barack Obama’s Rose Garden Address and his response to the Benghazi question in the
town hall debate between the President and Republican Nominee Mitt Romney as
epideictic events. This chapter discusses the important conclusions reached from
analyzing the two events as epideictic. In addition, this chapter provides insight for future
analyses wishing to critique ceremonial rhetoric.
First and foremost, this thesis helps to make sense of two recent rhetorical events.
Although the Benghazi attack garnered significant media attention, rhetorical scholars
have not sufficiently investigated the controversy. It is easy to describe Obama’s Rose
Garden speech as epideictic, but this analysis augments that characterization by exploring
the presence of two distinct genres, crisis rhetoric and eulogy. The town hall debate is, at
first glance, more difficult to distinguish as ceremonial. However, interpreting Obama’s
response to the Benghazi question as an epideictic moment contributes to a greater
understanding of the presidential debate overall. Even if presidential debates can be seen
as genuinely deliberative, that does not mean they should be seen only as deliberative.
Viewing them through an epideictic lens can reveal implications that are not otherwise
apparent.
Rhetorical acts can have meaning in many ways, so criticism must take many
forms. As Karlyn Kohrs Campbell argues, “the activity of criticism is rendered more
complicated by the fact that rhetorical and communicative acts are, themselves,
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complex.”1 “The combative, conflicting, dialectical character of criticism in our
discipline,” Campbell notes, “is a function of the qualities and characteristics of rhetorical
and communicative acts.”2 In other words, there is often a multiplicity of dimensions and
meaning present in any text; analyzing all of them requires a variety of analytical
approaches to fully grasp or exhaust a given text. Northrup Frye’s work on literary
criticism is easily applied to rhetorical criticism. Literary criticism, Frye argues, must be
polymorphous because literary events are polysemous in nature.3 Campbell contends that
Frye’s understanding of literature is how critics of rhetoric ought to understand rhetorical
events. Therefore, Campbell concludes, “Long-standing interest in the study of
movements and more recent interest in the study of campaigns and genres reflect a
recognition by rhetorical critics and students of persuasion that acts mean as members of
groups in addition to the meanings they have as unique acts.”4 In short, rhetorical acts can
be viewed as discrete efforts to produce specific results, as members of a genre, as
historical artifacts, as artistic creations, and so on. To say there is only one way of
apprehending a given text is short-sighted and counter-productive.
Surely presidential debates can be viewed as deliberative, but to foreclose the
possibility of examining them as epideictic is to eliminate the possibility of discovering
rhetorical patterns and strategies that would otherwise be left uncovered. Future research
would benefit from analyzing the deliberative elements of the town hall debate. However,
this project takes Celeste M. Condit’s advice and investigates the text as epideictic. The
Benghazi question was a test of the candidates’ credibility, and thus a test of their
suitability to be President of the United States, not their policies. Campbell articulates:
Because of the complexity of rhetorical and communicative acts, theoretical and
methodological perspectives must vary in order to account for their many
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dimensions. In the case of rhetorical and communication, the existence of a
single, dominant “paradigm” is evidence of disciplinary senility. Criticism of such
a unitary modality is a sign of returning health, and competition among a variety
of perspectives is indicative of maturity and vigor.5
In short, critics should investigate texts from every possible angle to inspire an on-going
conversation in the field about the state of rhetorical theory and how it assists in revealing
significant symbolic patterns.
A second important implication regards the scope of epideictic discourse. This
analysis makes evident the interpenetration between epideictic address and the everemerging body of research on public memory. Although some form of these connections
has been made elsewhere, they do not make explicit connections between public memory
and presidential crisis rhetoric, eulogy, and campaign events. Further, the texts examined
in this thesis are connected by the public memory of September 11, 2001. Public memory
does not necessarily depend on epideictic rhetoric to sustain itself, but all ceremonial
discourse in some way draws upon or influences collective remembering.
Each of Condit’s functional pairs relies upon public memory. When leaders define
troubling events, they explain them in pre-existing terms so that their entire audience has
a means of understanding what has occurred. That is not to say that such definitions do
not change the meaning of the original event. On the contrary, the collective
understanding of events shifts over time and adapts from past to present. The memory of
September 11, Edward Casey argues, has become a “stabilitas loci, a place for further
and future remembering” that is both “actual” and “memorial” because it has adapted and
evolved beyond its “given occasion.”6 In other words, the collective memory of
September 11, 2001, among U.S. citizens has continually provided leaders with
opportunities to explain troubling events to the public. Casey concludes that because of
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this, September 11 has become a deictic marker by a “consolidated memorial mass” that
functions as a “station in the American public’s sense of significant events in the early
twenty-first century.”7 When the World Trade Center and Pentagon were attacked on
September 11, it became what Casey calls “a major node in the horizontal structure” of
United States history that continues to extend itself.8
Memorialization of September 11 has repeatedly served as a vehicle for leaders to
shape and share a sense of community in the United States. Empirically the public
memory of September 11 has transcended bitter, partisan politics and brought the public
together. Commenting on the power of collective remembering, Barbie Zelizer notes that
this is how memory’s defining mark is constituted; it continually evolves across time and
space threading linkages between events from the past for “present-day aims.”9 It is
significant that the assault in Benghazi was on the anniversary of the September 11, 2001,
attacks. Zelizer contends that time is a social construction which constitutes memory
through temporal patterning in communities’ historical consciousness.10 When
commemorative dates and events collapse on one another, they form a linear connection
even if one had not existed prior. This is likely what Casey means when he refers to
September 11 as a new nodal point in U.S. history because it serves both to connect to the
past and orient the future.
Collective remembering is an ongoing, never-ending process. Certainly individual
memories fade from and enter into existence, but the rhetorical acts communities engage
in continues through other shared pasts. Communities, then, may even form or dissolve
because of their remembering or forgetting of particular memories. This is because,
Zelizer argues, “remembering is no longer seen as a finite activity;” instead “it is seen as
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a process that is constantly unfolding, changing, and transforming” and “continually
evolving across many points in time and space.”11 Memory’s constitutive defining mark
is that “memories confront each other, intermingle, fuse, or erase each other, according to
the destiny of the societies whose identity they help define.”12 In short, the public
memory of September 11 has afforded leaders, Obama in particular, opportunities to
extend the lineage of the original attacks on New York and the Pentagon; reaffirming the
messages which have taught citizens who we are and what we embody in troubling times
ever since.
Memories rooted in the September 11, 2001, attacks illustrate both how leaders
praise extraordinary individuals who sacrificed their lives and blame ideologies that
oppose the identity holding together U.S. citizens. In the aftermath of the attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the phrase “never forget” circulated throughout
public discussion. Obama echoed this sentiment in wake of the Benghazi attack by urging
citizens that the nation will not allow these attacks to continue happening. In other words,
the ideology behind the extermination of communities and the institutions defining who
they are is not limited to the likes of Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin. One important
purpose of public memory in epideictic rhetoric, then, is to promote civically-engaged
communities which strive to protect the U.S. from contrasting, authoritarian ideologies.
Uncovering such an avenue of exploration for critics suggests that there are additional
functions of epideictic rhetoric that go beyond classical oratory. This is not to say
classical studies of ceremonial discourse are not useful; rather, contemporary studies
borrow tools from classical rhetoric and build on them by using the past to build a present
that provides a more insightful future.
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Condit’s display/entertain function highlights the ways epideictic speakers
demonstrate their leadership over the object of praise or blame while also enhancing the
experience of listeners. Titling the function for listeners “entertainment” is slightly
misleading. Entertainment implies a degree of passivity where spectators in the audience
either applaud or belittle, but make no conclusion. The overarching purpose of
ceremonial rhetoric is to invite listeners’ judgment regarding the worthiness of an
object’s honor or the reverse. Therefore, the audience is not simply “entertained,” but
instead pushed to manifest such a judgment. As Chapter 3 noted, the pair
“display/manifestation” more closely reflects the epideictic function at play. Leaders
display mastery over iconic discursive figures and manifest a particular audience
judgment by encouraging them to appreciate and emulate those figures when they praise
them for their achievements or honors. Condit even explains that displays of eloquence
produce “a manifestation” of the qualities speakers praise and leaders who cite them
therefore produce “a sign of them.”13 In short, leaders embody their leadership in displays
of eloquence that manifest a vision of who the community is and how they will move
forward in troubling times, urging audience members to accept and appreciate that
manifestation.
Public memory certainly fits within the display/manifest function. Bradford
Vivian argues that given its social, cultural and political significance, the memory of
September 11 has “established official precedents concerning how future generations
would memorialize and thereby derive models for judgment and action.”14 Further,
Vivian notes that epideictic occasions repeating the mnemonic ritual of September 11
“derive order and purpose from seemingly senseless tragedy” for U.S. citizens.15 This
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makes the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon fundamental to affirming
the values that form an American identity. It has become, Vivian argues, “the most
symbolically representative national forum for the rites of public mourning and civic
restoration.”16 In short, the memory of September 11 has actively shaped U.S. citizens’
orientation towards a variety of troubling events through its symbolic re-presentation of
national loss, constantly evolving to meet the immediate contextual needs of listeners.
Even in an increasingly partisan political environment, the public memory of
September 11 proves useful in constructing ideal U.S. citizens that the community strives
to become, regardless of which side of the aisle they come from. Even in the midst of the
contentious presidential election campaign, the Obama Administration “quietly won”
congressional approval for what Eric Schmitt of the New York Times described as a hefty
budget increase in “counterterrorism aid.”17 This aid package was granted despite the fact
that the best evidence at the time of the budget increase approval came from anonymous
“officials” who could only offer that the assault suggested “the bad guys [sic] are making
plans and organizing’” and that requires taking on “new urgency.”18
Surely, there are multiple explanations for why President Obama was able to
obtain a counterterrorism aid package. The Rose Garden Address did not make a call for
this package. However, the public memory of September 11 was certainly a strategic aid
for the President. Denise Bostdorff argues that:
Presidents can draw upon collective memories, shaped as they are by aesthetic
messages, to link the current war with a favored past. The ceremonial setting and
the characteristics of epideictic rhetoric can also depict the present armed conflict
in ways that make it seem beautiful and that exploit the love inherently with
war—the love of comrades that prompts acts of courage, the love of war itself
displayed by individuals who repeatedly volunteer for dangerous acts of duty, and
the love that so many citizens have for wartime leaders—both to gain solidarity
and to quash dissent.19
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Succinctly, epideictic rhetoric offers leaders the potential to permeate partisan divides
through eloquent displays of leadership that promote civic duties, particularly in settings
involving crisis and conflict.
Investigating the town hall debate as an epideictic event also illuminates an
important implication of this thesis. Critics who scan the transcript of the town hall
debate in search of its deliberative elements might skip over the Benghazi question in its
entirety. One of the most significant moments for both Obama’s and Romney’s
credibility in the televised debates occurred during their responses to this question. This
is why Condit says that “If we were to be so bold as to proclaim presidential debates to be
epideictic speeches, we would recognize their importance . . . as one of our best chances
to judge the eloquence—the broad humane capacities—of a would-be leader.”20 I argue
that critics must be willing to take an even broader approach to presidential address.
Rarely does the President generate completely autonomous decisions for the nation, but
the country’s leader certainly acts as the face of the nation. Any successful deliberative
pitch by the President, then, requires a presumed degree of ethos that resonates through
the general public. In order to achieve this character, each policy on the President’s
agenda must follow some ceremonial event that popularizes the idea through reaching
into the past to build onto the present. As Condit argues about epideictic rhetoric
generally:
. . . a broad and use-oriented focus also indicates the value of a certain kind of
theory formation. We cannot adequately define epideictic or other genres or
theoretical constructs based solely on explanations of earlier theorists nor based
upon what our other theories seem to require. Rather, we need to work diligently
to connect theory and empirical study. The methodological moral . . . is that we
may enrich our understanding of discourse types by examining a broad range of
speeches as candidates for a genre and by examining some of these speeches and
their historical situations of use in great detail. Only by combining such empirical
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investigation with the clues and traditions of earlier theory will we cast a
theoretical net adequately wide and complex to capture usefully rich
understandings of human speech.21
There are many other studies which could use this thesis as a starting point. One
important suggestion for future research is that critics perform a more in-depth study
comparing George W. Bush’s September 20 Joint-Session Address to Congress with
Obama’s Rose Garden Address. Such an analysis would help draw connections between
the two presidencies and which value systems each used to manifest public judgment on
the nation-wide community during troubling times.
More importantly, critics should pay attention to the ways which the public
memory of September 11 is still re-appropriated by the Benghazi attack. Benghazi has
become recognized by political opponents as one of the greatest failures of several
members of the Obama Administration. According to Katie LaPotin, “Benghazi will . . .
be a key issue in the 2016 presidential race, as presumed Democratic nominee Hillary
Clinton’s political future hangs on the balance of any potential investigation.”22 White
House national security adviser Susan Rice still mourns September 11, 2012. The
Washington Times reported that “Ms. Rice said she has ‘experienced directly some of this
department’s greatest tragedies,’” and in particular she would “continue to mourn the
death of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other brave Americans in Benghazi” who
“died during an assault by forces linked to Al Qaeda in Libya, during the height of
President Obama’s reelection campaign.”23 John McCain recently criticized the Obama
Administration for its failure to respond to the terrorist threat in Libya:
There should be no doubt about the character of the assault on Benghazi. It was
professional, and the January report of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence asserts that for months intelligence reports were coming in indicating
that security in the area should have been beefed up. The Obama administration
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did the opposite. One has to wonder why? Why has not the administration been
charged with negligence?24
In short, politicians on both sides of the aisle continue framing the attack in Benghazi in
relation to September 11.
House GOP leadership has made clear that the Benghazi question is still relevant
in the public memory of U.S. citizens. As the Washington Times points out, “House
Speaker John A. Boehner announced not long after the attack that he was fed up and was
making it a ‘top priority’ to get the truth out to the American people” because of the way
the Obama Administration resorted to “deception and stonewalling to blur and block the
truth about Benghazi.”25 While Governor Romney did not take the opportunity to press
Obama on the discrepancies between the Rose Garden Address and Rice’s testimonies,
other politicians are still looking for answers and transparency. Senator Lindsey Graham
says that Rice’s story “was politically hatched out of the White House” in order to avoid
news of a terrorist attack seven weeks from an election.26
In upcoming elections, the Benghazi debate may become a focal point of
Republican strategy. Jim ONeill has argued that the public will be waiting for this time:
The Obama Administration (with the all too willing collusion of “journalistic”
propaganda outlets) has surrounded the Benghazi story with lies, obfuscations,
and blatant cover-ups, all designed to muddy the waters and hide the truth—and
Congress will not ferret out the truth unless “we the people” hold their feet to the
fire, and do it with a will. . . . At some point “we the people” have to stop pointing
our fingers at “them,” and put the responsibility for the mess our country is in
upon our own shoulders, and be about the serious business of cleaning house.
Insisting on hearing the truth about Benghazi would be a good place to start.27
LaPotin notes that “Americans across the political spectrum aren’t entirely convinced that
the truth about the Sept. 11, 2012, terrorist attack on the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi,
Libya has been fully uncovered, and think Congress should continue investigating the
matter to find out whether the White House acted improperly during its handling of the
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attack.”28 Citing poll data, LaPotin argues that “two in three Americans – including 50
percent of Democrats – believe that Congress should continue to investigate the White
House’s role in managing the attack, which resulted in the deaths of U.S. Ambassador
Christopher Stevens and three other Americans” and House Republicans continue to
ferociously lead the charge in continuing this investigation.29 Succinctly, the attack on the
U.S. Consulate in Benghazi will continue remain to politically relevant, the controversy
surrounding it continues to retain rhetorical significance.
The attack in Benghazi on September 11, 2012 is still a talking point because it
occurred on the anniversary of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
As USA Today notes, quoting Mike Morell, a recently retired CIA Deputy:
Republicans accuse the Obama administration of trying to mislead the American
people in the weeks before the 2012 presidential election so as not to ruin a
campaign theme that Obama had al-Qaeda on the run. . . . "The White House
needed the talking points to support their narrative that al-Qaeda was on the run,"
said Rep. Mike Rogers of Michigan, the committee's Republican chairman. "They
needed these talking points to say the attack was in response to a video." The
committee's top Democrat, Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger of Maryland, said the
committee reviewed thousands of documents related to the attack, viewed videos
and interviewed tens of witnesses, and proved nothing nefarious about how the
talking points were produced. "Today we've found no inappropriate motivations
and we have also found no inappropriate actions on the talking points,"
Ruppersberger said. "We have four dead American. We need to focus at this point
on tracking down the people who did this. And I hope we're close to that." The
attacks that killed U.S. Ambassador to Libya Chris Stevens and three other
Americans happened on the 11th anniversary of the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on
New York City and Washington.30
Summarily, rhetorical critics need to pursue an investigation of how the Benghazi
controversy influences and shapes the nation-wide community. There has yet to be
consensus on what occurred and who is responsible for the deaths of four U.S. diplomats.
Albert Einstein once said memory is deceiving since it is colored by the events of today.
The public memory of September 11, 2012, colors the events of yesterday, colors the
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events of today, and will color the events of tomorrow. This will become most evident
during the 2016 presidential election campaign should Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
become the Democratic Nominee. Research on presidential epideictic rhetoric in this
project provides a springboard for avenues of investigation when this public memory
resurges once again.
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